That is exactly the information that we need. We know that 360 attacks have been made by our planes, but what we do not know is how valid they were. Were they successful? Are they making a difference? Here we are, talking about intervening somewhere else, when we do not even know how successful our intervention has been in Iraq.
The expensively trained and equipped Iraqi army fell apart when confronted by Daesh. The army has serious structural issues, poor-quality leadership, and a sectarian divide that must be addressed before any real progress in combating Daesh is possible. The brutality of the Shia militias often forces Sunni tribes into seeing Daesh as the safer alternative; let us never move away from that recognition. Sunni reconciliation and the taming of the Shia militia are impossibly difficult. If we cannot make that happen in Iraq, what chance have we in Syria? What is the basis of the sectarian divide? Is it simply religion, or is it also the age-old strategy of divide and rule? Is it a question of getting groups to fight among themselves, and allowing the corruption and the repression of the autocratic ruling regime to continue, allowing the poverty to grow, and allowing young men to turn to jihadism when there is no work and no hope for the future?
In Syria there is no compelling image for the future, and there are no leaders to rally behind. Syria is a state in the midst of civil war. In Syria there is nothing that will pull people together, but in Iraq we have potential. There is a Shia president, a Sunni defence Minister, and a wonderful Kurdish president.
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