I will, I hope, be very brief. As the Secretary of State knows, it was in response to me that he made the mistake for which he has graciously and fully apologised to the House. I, for one, accept that it was entirely inadvertent.
However, I have two real points on the original clause 64 and amendment 102B in lieu. First, when my right hon. Friend wrote to me on 4 December 2014, he said in his concluding paragraph:
“I would like to make it clear that the clause as introduced strikes an appropriate balance, and where there is any real doubt that there could have been a substantial difference for the applicant, the court will be able to find that the threshold had not been met and can grant permission to proceed with judicial review.”
What that arouses in me is this reflection: the current rule developed by the courts is that where the outcome was “inevitable”, the court is enabled under the current authorities to decline a remedy. I ask my right hon. Friend, when he concludes this debate, to point out where there is a difference. If he is correct in saying that where there is any real doubt, the court will still be able to grant leave, how does that differ from the current situation? If the position is inevitable, the court will not grant a remedy now. Where there is any real doubt, it will grant a remedy. It is therefore difficult to see whether the common law test on whether the outcome is “inevitable”, despite the procedural defect, is affected very much by being changed from “inevitable” to “highly likely”. I am therefore puzzled about why we need this particular change.
I am relieved to have heard the tone of the speech of the hon. Member for Hammersmith (Mr Slaughter) from the Opposition Front Bench, because I am able much more easily to agree with him that there are substantial problems with the clause as drafted, specifically the one I have pointed out previously: it places judges in the invidious position of effectively having to take the decision themselves. They go from being reviewers of a decision to being decision makers. If we are asking somebody to say what would have happened had the
facts not been as they are and how a decision is likely to have been taken, the judge is inevitably going to have to ask, “What would I have done, based on the evidence that is being put before me? What would a reasonable person have done?” That places the judge in the invidious position of being much closer to a decision maker.
The courts studiously avoid doing that. They adopt the position of being reviewers of a decision and they are enabled at the moment to decline a remedy when a matter is utterly obvious and inevitable because that does not put them in the position of having to second-guess the decision of the proper constitutional authority that has made the decision they are reviewing. When it is obvious and inevitable and when no reasonable person could come to any other conclusion but that the decision would have been the same, the courts are not in the position of having to speculate about how a reasonable person—how they, the judge—would have approached the problem in the same circumstances based on the evidence.
That is why I think the provisions represent a fundamental change constitutionally. It is one that Conservatives should lament, because instead of the courts allowing the proper body—the Executive—to take the decision, the Executive are inviting the court to place itself in the position of taking that decision. As a result of frustration with procedural defects that seem to the Executive not to be particularly meritorious and to hold up Executive decisions, they are saying to the judge, “Well, you take the decision. You can take the decision and you can say that it would have been the same anyway.” That is constitutionally wrong and it is something that the courts have avoided—in my submission, rightly. That is why I voted against the Government on the last occasion and why I am afraid that unless my right hon. Friend the Lord Chancellor can persuade me today I shall vote against the Government again. This is a point of principle and an important one and it is not affected by the Government’s amendment in lieu, which I otherwise welcome.
As for amendment (a) in lieu, I have never come across the expression “exceptional public interest” and I do not understand what it means. Every public interest is exceptional and the only public interest that is likely to be at stake is the public interest in fair and decent governance. Fair, consistent, rational administration is the public interest at stake in allowing somebody or an Executive authority simply to avoid the consequences of an unfair procedure. What other public interest would there be but that? It would simply be a case of someone saying, “I think this is so unfair that even though I think I probably would have decided it in the same way had the procedural defect not taken place, I still think leave should be granted.” That seems nonsense with which to confront a court, and my regretful submission —regretful, because I find it extremely difficult to diverge from the Government, particularly as I believe that my right hon. Friend ought to be commended for rethinking this and considering his new amendment—is that I would like him to consider whether it might not be better drafted. For example, I really do not understand why it could not have said something like, “There are exceptional circumstances that make it in the public interest for the application for permission to be granted.”
I do not understand what is meant by “exceptional public interest”. Although I applaud the sentiment behind the amendment, I am not able to support it as drafted.
In the previous debate I adumbrated my concern about the proposal to put judges in the position of decision maker and to make applications for permission cumbersome and evidence-heavy. Public authorities will be induced to bombard the judge with all the reasons, even if they are wrong about the defect in procedure, that the decision would inevitably have been taken or, in this case, highly likely to have been taken. The judge will then have to embark on an inquiry at permission stage into whether or not it is highly likely that the decision would have been taken. That will induce evidence to be submitted by the other side, and so permission hearings will be unwieldy.
For all those reasons, I shall listen attentively to what my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State says in concluding the debate, but I regret to say that it will take considerable persuading to induce me to vote with the Government on this occasion.