This group of amendments relates to the Government’s plans to create a privacy and civil liberties board. Clause 36 does not actually tell us very much—it is an enabling clause—so I have tabled amendments 24 and 25 to allow us to debate what the board will actually do.
As the clause is currently drafted, we have a name for the board, and there are three possible ways it could go. First, we have an idea of what a privacy and civil liberties board could look like from its name, which invokes the idea of a body with a wide remit of work on privacy and civil liberties issues in the United Kingdom, and which would safeguard human rights. Such a body would be very similar to the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which was created by a Labour Government.
Secondly, the Home Office has published terms of reference, which suggest a body that will support the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation in providing oversight of counter-terrorism legislation in the UK and investigating the operation of that legislation. We think that what is contained in the terms of reference is sensible and would provide both capacity and openness in the oversight of counter-terrorism policy. However, as I have said, clause 36 is quite an empty provision at the moment.
The third possible version of the board is as currently constituted in clause 36, which gives the Home Secretary powers to create—in future, if she wishes to do so—procedures, membership and the work plan for the board and provisions on publishing of reports. All those details are left to future secondary legislation.
If the body is created it is important that it has strong powers. Our amendments 23 to 26 would help achieve that. The post of independent reviewer of terrorism legislation has been around for over 40 years and its current formulation was created by a Labour Government. The post works well, and both holders of it since 2001 have served with real distinction. That does not mean that we are opposed to further strengthening of the
oversight arrangements. Earlier this year, the current independent reviewer, David Anderson, QC, identified the limitations of his reviewer role, including the fact that it was restricted to certain statutes and the fact that significant powers, including those in the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, were excluded and were therefore going unreviewed. He also pointed out that as a part-time reviewer without proper administrative support, he has extremely limited capacity.