I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his intervention, but as I have just said to the right hon. Member for Holborn and St Pancras, the point is that what is a reasonable excuse will be tested in the courts. I did not quote the exact words but I cited the spirit of the point in clause 9(4). As I say, that matter would be tested by the courts and it would be for them to determine whether or not what the hon. Gentleman describes constituted a reasonable excuse.
9.45 pm
Let me deal with two specific points about the Opposition proposals, the first of which relates to the process of information going to carriers for the notification and managed return order. The proposal works only because the full name and birth details of individuals are disclosed to all carriers. The existence of that list and any failure by any carrier to protect that data could expose a number of individuals to mistreatment, and we must not forget that some countries’ national airlines are state owned and operated. This goes to the point I made when I intervened on the right hon. Member for Delyn: there is a real difference between saying that the Government hold all the information, obtain it from the carriers through advance passenger information about individuals, carry out the matching, determine whether there is an individual for whom authority to carry should not be given and then give that information on that individual to the carrier, and the Opposition’s proposal, whereby information on a large number of individuals should be given to all carriers on the off chance that one of those individuals will attempt to travel with one of those carriers.
That difference is important, and as I indicated in earlier remarks, what we have found in dealing with carriers is that they feel, as the Government do, that the responsibility for getting that matching process right in determining whether authority to carry should be given for an individual should rest with the Government. On requiring that notification from the carriers, the information
as to who is being carried is already provided by carriers when they submit advance passenger information to the Government’s border system. But, as I say, it is then for the Government to determine whether one of those individuals is somebody against whom action should be taken through not providing the authority to carry.
As part of the TEO, the individual’s passport will have been cancelled, which makes it much more difficult for them to travel through other countries. That point was made by a number of Members, including my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield. He, like a number of other hon. Members, mentioned the other issue I wish to deal with: whether or not the decision to impose a TEO should be for the courts or for the Secretary of State. Comparisons were made with TPIMs, where we have that judicial process in place, but even in that process the initial decision is taken by the Secretary of State. Arguments have been made in the past that the decision should be given over entirely to the courts, but I have been clear that it is important that such decisions, where we are imposing restrictions on an individual, are being taken by someone who is democratically elected and therefore accountable to the electorate—to the people—for them.
As for whether or not there should then be a separate automatic court process in relation to the imposition of a TEO, this is about the operation of a royal prerogative in terms of the cancellation of a passport, and that operation currently does not have that judicial process inserted within it—the decision is taken by the Secretary of State. That is the first point to make. The second point is that the TPIMs have far more restrictions that can be imposed on an individual than would be imposed simply by the TEO. A number of hon. Members referred to the TEO in terms of taking away the right of abode for somebody in the UK, and I intervened on the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion in respect of her use of the term “exile”. This is not about saying to somebody that they are for ever exiled from the United Kingdom and cannot return. This is about not stopping somebody’s right of abode in the United Kingdom, but saying to an individual about whom there is concern that they have been involved in terrorism-related activity outside the UK that when they return they will do so on the basis of a process that the Government have put in place such that their return can be managed.