I had not intended to speak today, but I have been sitting here getting rather more uncomfortable about some aspects of the proposal. I do not propose to go into the complex practical issues, which were well laid out by the right hon. Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Frank Dobson), who gave thoughtful input, as ever, and by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve). They outlined the issues and complexities very well and I suspect that those complexities will best be addressed by negotiation between those on the two Front Benches, which is not something I often recommend.
What concerns me today is the issue of the Home Secretary herself exercising the power. I am concerned that it comes about without prior judicial approval or, indeed, without being a power of the court, which would be my preference. Over time, I have become progressively concerned about the accretion of fairly absolute power to the state in counter-terrorism policy. Absolute power is pretty important. My hon. Friend the Member for Skipton and Ripon (Julian Smith) suggested that these measures did not impinge on people’s liberties in the same way as TPIMs might, but I am afraid that the impingement is pretty sizeable. I do not necessarily disapprove of it at all, but it should be exercised with a degree of judicial care.
These accretions of power have come about since the late 1980s and the 1990s when we avowed the various security services that had up until then not been recognised in public policy, or that were at least not in the public domain. At the time, it seemed quite reasonable for the Crown prerogative to be used as a method of giving warrants and of enacting the state’s will to protect the public. I took the 1994 Bill on the Secret Intelligence Service through the House. We did not foresee the level of use—the number of warrants used and the level of power being exercised—that is now necessary to deal with the Islamist terrorist threat.
What is more, we did not give much thought to how such power might be abused—not that it is at the moment, but it might be in the future—or how many errors might occur, which does happen. We had at the back of our mind a model of accountability that, frankly, does not work. The Minister for Security and Immigration will be familiar with the number of times on which he and I have had exchanges that amount to my asking him a question and his writing back something like, “I never comment on security matters.” That is not a particularly good form of accountability for any mechanism.
My concern is that along with progressive secrecy, secret courts and all the other things we now have, the weak accountability—