My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary opened the debate by referring to the nature of the threat, as did my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) in his contribution. The truth is that in some quarters there is a continual effort to suggest that the characterisation of the threat is in some way designed for political purposes. Both my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary and my right hon. and learned Friend have been closer to the centre of the ring of secrecy than I ever have, although we on the Intelligence and Security Committee do acquire a degree of information that is not public. It is important that people understand that what we are facing is unprecedented, and that in such conditions, in deciding where the balance rests between security and privacy, it may be felt necessary to tilt the balance in a direction other than that in which one would normally wish to tilt it.
May I make one preliminary point? I happened to be at St Andrews university yesterday conferring degrees on grateful students, and in the course of that it became clear to me that there is some anxiety among the university authorities about how they would properly implement the obligations that may be placed upon them. I therefore agree with the shadow Home Secretary that my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary’s guidance in this matter is going to be of enormous importance. I am sure it will be as well drawn as possible, but the sooner that guidance is available, perhaps even for consultation, the better.
In my intervention on my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary, I made it clear that I am still not yet persuaded about the legality of the temporary exclusion order. It is helpful to look briefly at the conditions that would apply to someone against whom such an order was pronounced. They would be required not to return to the United Kingdom unless one of two conditions was satisfied: either the Secretary of State has issued a permit, or the individual has been deported to the United Kingdom. Some concern has been expressed about the fact that it is entirely within the power of my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary, or indeed her successors, to apply the terms of such a permit. We are entitled to assume that they will be reasonable, but they may not be reasonable in the mind of the person against whom they are directed.
So far, it has been perfectly clear from the contributions that have been made that everyone accepts that the exclusion of a British-born national from the United Kingdom is contrary to both law and practice. The right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield was eloquent in his description of what the common law amounted to. Is it not the case that the effect of exclusion is to remove the right of statehood to return, even if only temporarily, if the individual accepts the terms of a permit? If an individual does not accept the terms of a permit—subject to the fact that the orders have to be renewed at two-yearly intervals—the individual may, in effect, be unable to return in perpetuity to the United Kingdom, of which he or she is a national.
The Prime Minister’s original statement on 1 September suggested that some kind of blanket ban on return could be effected, and my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield and I were both at pains to say that we doubted the legality of that. I understand that the temporary exclusion order is designed to bring
within the sphere of legality the provision that the Government consider to be appropriate. However, I maintain my reservations for this reason: if the right to return is a matter of such principle, it can be neither capable of modification nor subject to conditionality. We are told that we are dealing with managed return. If it is managed return, why is it described in the Bill as a temporary exclusion order? The sense is turned right around by the description in the Bill, notwithstanding the explanation that my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary has given.