I declare my interests as they appear in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests.
On Second Reading I raised my concerns about the provisions in clause 75 and part 7, and related issues in part 8 and schedule 3, to set up a register of people with significant control—in effect, a register of beneficial ownership. I questioned whether they would have benefit in terms of countering illegal activity or investigating tax evasion, even if this was at the triple cost of loss of privacy, increasing the regulatory burden on companies and threatening investment in British companies. Since that time, my concerns that we are doing the wrong thing have been increased, not reduced.
I am sorry not to have been given time to speak to my tabled amendments. It is of concern also that the issue of privacy was not raised by any amendments tabled in Committee, with the honourable exception of the wise remarks made by my hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Robert Jenrick) in the stand part debate. He raised the key question: how many of the 22.5 million English companies is it actually suspected may be subject to some wrongdoing that could be tackled by these proposals? This question has yet to be answered by the Minister or anyone else. I respectfully suggest that this is not the proper process for encouraging investment or portraying this Government as business-friendly.
The Under-Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, the hon. Member for East Dunbartonshire (Jo Swinson), replied in Committee that the impact assessments undertaken indicated that
“our proposed measures are lawful, necessary and proportionate”––[Official Report, Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Public Bill Committee, 30 October 2014; c. 423.]
So I went through the impact assessment, and I cannot find such justification at all. In fact, it is by some way the weakest case I have ever read in an impact assessment. For instance, the impact assessment makes it clear that there exists little or no data or academic literature quantifying the proposition that a reduction in crime will follow as a result of a register of people with significant control.
My prediction is that these part 7, clause 75 and schedule 3 provisions will not work. In many instances there will be confusion as to who or what is a shareholder with significant control—for instance, in terms of family holdings, let alone complicated trusts, with expensive advice then required. The proposed data collection method is based on self-reporting, with no verification mechanism, which could make it easy, especially for non-resident shareholders, to misreport or simply to give the shares to someone else to hold.
For the purpose of this debate, let us take as our starting point the G8 agreement that companies should know who their shareholders are. I repeat: companies—not commercial competitors, NGOs, direct marketers, spammers or providers of financial services looking for clients, let alone criminals, fraudsters and all the others who could use or misuse information provided under these provisions.
Now we have the further G20 communiqué proposing a crackdown on secret shell companies. However, this was not accompanied by a call for share registers to be made public. So how did we get from the narrow G8 and G20 proposals to what we have in the Bill?