Forgive me, but I will not give way. I want to ensure that others have a chance to debate the clause and my new clause, and I need to make some progress.
Why therefore should responsible commissioners who have worked successfully with their local NHS trusts to produce a sustainable set of NHS services be prejudiced by the failure of a commissioner who has not secured such an outcome? Clause 119 risks penalising responsible co-operation between commissioners and providers, and it gives a veto to the potentially irresponsible. My new clause removes that inequality by providing that commissioners of services at an NHS trust that is affected by any proposed changes should be placed in the same position as the commissioner of those services covered by the administration process.
Secondly, my new clause makes it clear that, if the special administrator issues a final report recommending changes at a trust that is not in special administration, the decision makers to decide whether those changes ought to be accepted should be the commissioners of services at the successful trust and not the trust special administrator, the Secretary of State or Monitor. Clause 119 envisages that the TSA can recommend changes at an NHS foundation trust which is not in special administration, but fails to provide any mechanism to put those changes into effect. It follows that the recommendation from the TSA is left hanging in the air. The TSA cannot impose decisions on a reluctant CCG, because the Secretary of State is unable to direct CCGs and cannot, through Monitor, require changes to the services by the foundation trusts.
When making submissions to the Court of Appeal in the Lewisham case, leading counsel for the Government accepted that chapter 5A of the Health Act 2009 was a purely procedural statute. Chapter 5A does not provide any additional powers for the Secretary of State or Monitor. It simply defines the process that must be followed before existing powers may be exercised. The TSA takes over the role of the board of the trust in administration, so that it can make decisions about that organisation. The Secretary of State and Monitor have powers to dissolve NHS bodies, but the TSA does not have a role with regard to any trust that it is not administering. There is therefore a fundamental problem with clause 119 in that particular case, and that is what my new clause attempts to address.
I am proposing a new clause that would make it clear that a TSA report is to be provided to commissioners of services at any affected trust who are the decision makers as to whether they wish to accept or reject the recommendations. They are the relevant decision makers —in other words, the local commissioners.