I am grateful for that intervention, which puts the matter on the record.
The shadow Minister expressed concern about the costs of dealing with IPNAs and the new regime that we propose to introduce. It is worth quoting the chief constable of Thames Valley police, Sarah Thornton, who said:
“So in terms of improving the effectiveness, yes we are going to have to train officers, but I think that is worthwhile…If there is a bit of additional training cost, it really would be well worth it in terms of additional effectiveness in tackling anti-social behaviour locally.”
In other words, the relatively modest amount spent on training on IPNAs will more than repay itself in terms of the results that accrue. It is also worth pointing out that ASBOs were not without their costs either; it would be foolish to think that they were. A cost was involved in dealing with breaches of ASBOs just as there is with anything else. If I remember correctly, the shadow Minister quoted a cost of £1.5 million for breaches of IPNAs—allegedly; I am not quite sure where that figure comes from—but ASBO breaches cost money as well. If he wants to make a fair comparison, he ought to include that in his assessment.
Let me turn to the amendments tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Southwark North and Bermondsey—[Interruption.] I am sorry—Bermondsey North and Southwark. I want to call it Southwark and Bermondsey because that it is what it was for so many years. Anyway, I mean my very old friend who moved the amendments. His amendments and those of the hon. Member for Aberavon (Dr Francis) pick up a number of points raised by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which is of course a very important Committee of this House. I am grateful to the Committee for its detailed scrutiny of the Bill. Taken together, the amendments would introduce additional requirements that professionals and the courts would have to meet in order to use the new powers. While I agree that we must ensure that appropriate safeguards are in place, I believe that those are already built into the Bill and fear that the Committee’s amendments would lose some of the benefits of our reforms in streamlining powers and processes to help victims and empower front-line professionals.
New clause 33 is concerned with the use of injunctions in cases involving children and seeks to place in the Bill a requirement that the interests of the child are treated as a primary consideration when imposing an injunction, any associated conditions or sanctions for a breach. In shaping our reforms, we have, naturally, carefully considered the needs and rights of young people, which are important, so that we get the right balance between enforcement and helping those who commit antisocial behaviour to turn their lives around. I am a little concerned, to be honest, about the use of the word “primary” in new clause 33 with regard to setting that balance.
8.45 pm
The injunction to prevent nuisance and annoyance can be used to deal with a wide range of behaviours, many of which can cause serious harm to victims and communities, but it must not become a means of targeting young people simply for being young people. We have been explicit in the draft guidance to front-line professionals—it was published last week—that in deciding what is “nuisance or annoyance” they must be mindful
that the injunction should not be used to stop reasonable, trivial or benign behaviours that have not caused and are not likely to cause harm to victims or communities. For example, children simply playing in a park or on a street, or young people lawfully gathering or socialising in a particular place, may be annoying to some, but those activities are not in themselves antisocial and should not be treated as such.
For cases where an injunction is sought and issued, we have included provisions for consultation so that youth offending teams, as well as any other agencies, such as local authorities and youth charities, are to be involved in the process.
The Bill also requires that the court must hear the views of the relevant youth offending team in breach proceedings. This will also allow the court to hear the views of the young person, in addition to the young person’s views being put forward through a legal representative. Moreover, the Bill explicitly specifies that a court can impose a detention order on a young person only as a very last resort—that is, where it determines that, because of the severity or extent of the breach, no other power available is appropriate.
As I said in response to an earlier amendment, given that the injunction is civil it will not criminalise young people. Indeed, it should prevent criminality, through the use of positive requirements. In these ways the new powers improve on the orders they replace in order to give young people who behave antisocially the best chance of addressing the underlying causes of their antisocial behaviour in the long term, which benefits both the perpetrator and the victims. I emphasise that normal behaviour is not being caught by this. I want to make it very clear that there should be no court orders for playing in the street.
On reporting, I accept there is a balance to be struck. Publicising orders can provide reassurance to victims and communities that action has and will be taken when they report antisocial behaviour. However, I agree that, when deciding to publicise an order against a young person, agencies must be satisfied that doing so is necessary and proportionate, taking into account the likely effect on the young person in question. We have made it clear in the draft guidance that agencies must carefully decide each case on its own facts. That is already the way the courts have approached these provisions and I expect them to be very careful in their use of this particular power.
Amendments 158 to 162 relate to the definitions in respect of the injunction, specifically to the test and the conditions that may be attached to them. I reassure my right hon. Friend that the injunction is an arbitrary or unreasonable power and that in my view it achieves much of what he seeks in his amendments.
The test for issuing an injunction has two stages: an applicant must satisfy the court, first, that an individual has engaged or threatened to engage in conduct causing nuisance or annoyance and, secondly, that it is just and convenient to grant the injunction. The test of “just and convenient” is well known to the courts, being the test that currently applies to the granting of an antisocial behaviour injunction. It is, therefore, supported by several years of case law. As part of the test, in deciding whether to issue an injunction the court must, as a public body bound by the Human Rights Act, have regard to the principles of proportionality and reasonableness before granting an application.
Similarly, any prohibitions or positive requirements granted must be for the purpose of preventing the respondent from engaging in antisocial behaviour, so it would not be possible or right to impose requirements that were completely unrelated to the respondent’s antisocial behaviour. It is important not to import new requirements into the test that could set the threshold too high and delay providing relief to victims and communities.