I hope to assure the right hon. Gentleman that we will be there, influencing and seeking to negotiate the measure. We may not be opting in at the outset, but that should not in any way, shape or form be taken as the UK Government’s not wishing to seek to
influence the measure and create the changes that we believe are necessary for us to consider a subsequent opt-in, post adoption.
The right hon. Gentleman will want to congratulate Rob Wainwright, whom he spoke to on his recent visit, on the important job that he is doing to make Europol an effective, well-managed and widely respected organisation in the fight against international crime.
We can point to other examples. Operation Golf, which has been cited several times previously in this House, was a joint UK-Romania investigation team targeting a specific Romanian organised crime network. Offences associated with the network included human trafficking, money laundering, benefit fraud, perverting the course of justice, theft, and handling stolen goods. Europol provided analytical support and facilitated real-time checks on its systems, and 126 individuals were arrested in the UK. Europol’s help in Operation Seagrape led directly to the identification of bank accounts used by a people-smuggling gang based near Dunkirk. French, Belgian and British agencies worked jointly to target a specific organised crime group, and 36 arrests were made. It is for those reasons that the Government believe that it is in the national interest to seek to rejoin the current arrangements for Europol agreed back in 2009 as part of the 2014 decision. That was made clear in our discussions in the previous debate.
However, that is not the matter before us now. Instead, we need to decide whether to opt into the new regulation, which sets down new rules and powers for Europol and, we believe, would change its relationship with member states in some quite troubling ways. Our first concern is with the proposals on data exchange. The Commission wants member states to share more data with Europol. That is a good idea in principle; after all, Europol can only be as effective as the information it holds. However, a strong legal obligation to supply it with data, as proposed in the draft regulation, is a different matter. It would undermine member states’ control over their own law enforcement intelligence, which we regard as absolutely fundamental.
Even more worrying is the fact that the draft regulation does not exempt member states from providing information even if it could damage national security, or endanger ongoing operations or an individual’s safety. These protections are explicit in the existing instrument governing Europol but absent from the new proposal. That is a significant change. The proposal also strengthens Europol’s power to request investigations. It can already do this to some extent, but the new proposal creates a presumption that member states will comply with a request. It also strengthens their duty to give reasons if they decide not to do so. That is particularly worrying because any reasons could be subject to challenge before the European Court of Justice.
The European Scrutiny Committee has asked whether article 276 of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union would protect us from having a refusal challenged in the Court. We are not convinced that it would. Article 276 prevents the Court from reviewing
“the validity or proportionality of operations carried out by the police or other law enforcement services”.
It is highly debatable whether a decision to refuse to open an investigation would constitute
“operations carried out by the police”
because, by definition, no operation would have been carried out. We therefore do not think that article 276 provides enough protection against the Court’s involvement. This creates a real risk of the European Court being able to second-guess our policing priorities. That would simply be unacceptable. Policing is a core function of a sovereign state and it must remain a member state responsibility.