The right hon. Gentleman has put the point very well, and I am sure the whole House has listened to the example he provided. It is exactly such examples that make me think it right for us to ensure that we have a system that is better to operate. As he says, this is not only about relationships between Governments, but about the course of justice. That is why we want to ensure the more suitable, proper and swifter extradition arrangements that the EAW provides.
I said that our proposed list of measures for opting in was chosen because the measures would improve the practical fight against crime and the co-operation to achieve it. We of course await the views of the Scrutiny Committee and the Select Committees, but, for example, we want our law enforcement agencies to be able to establish joint investigation teams with colleagues in other European countries; we plan to rejoin the European supervision order, which allows British subjects to be bailed back to the UK rather than spend months and months abroad awaiting trial; and the second-generation Schengen information system—a new way of sharing law enforcement alerts throughout Europe—has the capacity to bring significant savings to our criminal justice system, as well as make it easier to identify foreign criminals. Again, this is just a question of practical co-operation, so the Government plan to join the database. I hope the House will see from the list of measures that the vast majority of what the Government propose to opt back into is uncontroversial, and based on the very sensible principle of “co-operation not control”.
I want to reiterate the Government’s position on Europol. As I mentioned earlier, the House will debate its future later tonight. The Government believe that Europol does excellent work under its British director, Rob Wainwright, which is why we propose to rejoin Europol in its existing form as part of the 2014 decision. There is a separate decision to be taken about Europol, and tonight’s debate will not be about the organisation in its current form but in its proposed future form. As things stand, the Commission proposes to change Europol’s governance and powers, potentially allowing it to direct national police forces and requiring us to share sensitive intelligence crucial to our national security. I believe that would be entirely unacceptable. These powers are unnecessary and would undermine our way of policing—and Europol has not even asked for them. The motive of the Commission appears to be nothing more than state-building. That is why we will not opt into the new Europol regulation and will never do so until those concerns have been put beyond doubt.
Some of my hon. Friends have been keen for me to address the question of the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. I have mentioned it already, but let me look at the issue once again. Between 1995 and the end of November 2009, 136 measures in the field of police and criminal justice were adopted in Brussels under the so-called third pillar. This meant that they were not the usual EU Acts and were not subject to either Commission enforcement powers or the full jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. As a result, we could not be told by others that we had not implemented things properly
and we could not be fined millions of pounds as a result. There were no European Court rulings that bound us, and we had a veto in negotiations.
When the last Government signed the Lisbon treaty, they changed the constitutional basis of the European Union, giving more powers over police and criminal justice matters to European institutions, and removing our veto in police and criminal justice. Now, at the end of a five-year transitional period on 1 December 2014, these pre-Lisbon measures become subject to Commission enforcement powers and the full jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice.
In fact, the whole justice and home affairs structure since Lisbon takes too much control away from elected national Governments. The Commission or the Council propose a measure, and the UK has the right to decide not to opt in, but if we decide that the measure is in the national interest and we do opt in, we are subject not only to qualified majority voting in the Council but to co-legislation rules in which the European Parliament is considered to be an equal to the Council of Ministers. Elected national Governments are sidelined—and that is before we even consider the role of the European Court of Justice in interpreting the measure once it becomes binding.