My right hon. Friend makes a good point: when we go to a hospital, we find that no one is there, because those in such jobs are not real people. Indeed, I might add Members of Parliament to that list.
The hon. Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mark Field) was desperately trying to be positive about the Budget, but in the process he effectively damned
the Chancellor with faint praise. If we had pressed him hard enough, I think he would have conceded most of our points.
The Bill will clearly do nothing to transform our economy. We are in a desperate state—an ongoing recession. The Chancellor says that his Budget is fiscally neutral, but when 2.5 million people are unemployed and we have low or negative growth, we do not want a fiscally neutral Budget. We should have had an expansionary Budget to promote growth, but of course even a fiscally neutral Budget could inject growth into the economy by raising taxes and spending more, rather than doing the opposite. If taxes on businesses and the wealthy are reduced, they tend to save their money—indeed, they put it in tax havens—whereas if ordinary people are given jobs, the first thing they do is to spend their money, and that money goes directly back into the economy and starts to generate demand through the multiplier.
The hon. Member for Cities of London and Westminster was right that forecasting is difficult. I remember that in 1990—I am older than everybody else in the Chamber—when The Sunday Times carried out a survey of forecasting organisations, it found that the London Business School was bottom of the league, scoring nought out of 10 for its forecasts, although of course that was the forecasting body adored by the Conservative Government under Mrs Thatcher. The best forecasts were by the Cambridge Economic Policy Group, a left-leaning Keynesian group, which got six out of 10 to come top of the league. The then Government were so annoyed by the Cambridge group that they took away its Government grant because they did not like people telling them that they were wrong, although they were.
Demand for the things that people produce is a crucial factor if an economy is to succeed, because although Governments can cut taxes for businesses and introduce all sorts of supply-side measures, if no one is buying anything, the economy will not grow. An equally crucial factor for sustaining that demand is an appropriate exchange rate. Successive Governments have ignored the exchange rate at their peril, but there have been times when the depreciation of our currency has had dramatic results, and I can cite three examples under a Conservative Government. Following Golden Wednesday and the collapse of the exchange rate mechanism, the economy grew strongly after a substantial depreciation. By the time that 1997 came along, the Conservatives were still being condemned for the collapse of the housing market and the people voted Labour—thank goodness for that—yet the Labour Government benefited from the strong demand generated by that depreciation. In 1979 Mrs Thatcher was praised for her economic policies, but the 1979 Budget, masterminded, if I can describe it like that, by Geoffrey Howe, resulted in a catastrophic collapse in demand. A fifth of manufacturing disappeared and unemployment soared to 3 million. It was only when those policies were reversed that there was a recovery, and under Nigel Lawson’s watch—I do not necessarily agree with everything he did—the pound depreciated by over 30%. Again, the economy grew strongly and unemployment came down.
Going back even further into history, in the 1931 crisis, a Labour Government mistakenly tried to sustain sterling on the gold standard, and tried to keep its parity up. The Government fell apart, and effectively a Conservative Government with a nominally Labour
Prime Minister came in straight afterwards. The first thing they did was take the pound off the gold standard and depreciate, and the recovery began. That was only part of it; other factors were necessary to sustain recovery in the 1930s. We had to spend a lot of money, and towards the end of the ’30s the country built thousands—indeed, millions—of houses, and that was how we recovered. That is what we ought to do now.
In other countries, Germany built arms and autobahns; in America, there was the new deal—spending money on all sorts of public works, which created the demand in the economy that brought about recovery. It was not fiddling around with tax rates and supply-side measures. That did not work then, and it will not work now. The exchange rate is therefore absolutely crucial, and the exchange rate at this time is too high. Part of our recovery should depend on a significant depreciation. An erudite and informed book by my friend, John Mills, has been written about this, and I have quoted from it in the Chamber. It makes a detailed case for such measures.
The trade statistics are disastrous, and some of us have been worried about manufacturing for a long time. Our manufacturing sector is about half the size of the German manufacturing sector as a proportion of our economy, which is disastrous. We should be a similar economy to Germany in many ways. Historically, we have been very similar in all sorts of ways, but our manufacturing has collapsed. That was partly because in 1997, when Labour came to office, there was at the same time a substantial appreciation of the pound, which began to damage manufacturing. We were sustained by an asset price bubble, which carried on, and thank goodness, we had a relatively strong economy for some time. However, manufacturing did not do well, because of the relatively strong pound. It was only the crisis of 2008, when there was a significant depreciation, that saved us. Had we been stuck in the euro, we would be like Spain now—it would be absolutely disastrous—so we must applaud my right hon. Friend the Member for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath (Mr Brown) for keeping us out of the euro, despite pressure from the then Prime Minister. I was one of those who supported my right hon. Friend very strongly at the time.