No final decision has been made on the precise list of what will be tested for. We are grateful for the contributions and representations that have been
made, and when we are in a position to provide the details we will do so. We obviously want to ensure that a wide range of drugs whose consumption could lead to increased risk on our roads are covered, but the line will need to be drawn somewhere and there will be practical considerations to take into account. We will obviously want to ensure that we inform everybody once the deliberations have run their course.
On new clause 18 and amendment 120, my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate (Mr Burrowes) has explained that he is concerned about the penalty regimes for drink and drug-driving. That is the issue that has exercised people the most, so I think it will be helpful if I dwell on it for a while. The new drug-driving offence created in clause 41 will be subject to the same penalty regime as the existing drink-driving offence of driving or being in charge of a motor vehicle with an alcohol concentration above the prescribed limit. The penalties available are mandatory disqualification from driving for at least a year, and a fine of up to £5,000, and/or imprisonment for up to six months. In addition, there is the offence in section 3A of the Road Traffic Act 1988 of causing death by careless driving while under the influence of drink or drugs, which carries a penalty of up to 14 years’ imprisonment. It is necessary for the prosecution to show that a person’s driving was careless to secure a conviction for that offence.
Section 3ZB of the 1988 Act makes it a criminal offence to cause death by driving while unlicensed, disqualified or uninsured. The maximum penalty is two years’ imprisonment, or a fine, or both. Amendment 120 would amend that section to include people who were driving with a specified controlled drug in their body in excess of a specified limit. Importantly for my hon. Friend, carelessness does not have to be proved to secure a conviction under that section. I know that he is concerned that requiring the prosecution to prove carelessness puts too great a burden on it, but the Government are not aware of any recent cases in which that has proved problematic. The hon. Member for Walthamstow made that point.
The test for carelessness is broad, and CPS guidance suggests that a wide variety of circumstances should be considered as carelessness. Indeed, in the case of Lillian Groves, which has been raised by the hon. Member for Croydon Central (Gavin Barwell)—although he is in another debate now, he has been extremely vigilant in pursuing the case on behalf of his constituents—the driver was convicted of causing death by careless driving. It therefore seems likely that if the new offence had been in force when the tragedy took place, the defendant would have been tried under the section 3A offence, provided that the prosecution could also show that he had a specified controlled drug in his body in excess of the specified limit.
However, if my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate or interested groups can provide evidence that prosecutors are failing to prosecute drivers for the section 3A offence because they cannot show that the driver was careless, the Department for Transport has undertaken to review the case for amending legislation. The changes in the Bill will make a difference, but the carelessness provision already stands and we have no reason to believe that it will prevent prosecutions, as the
hon. Member for Walthamstow suggested. However, if evidence of that is brought to our attention we will of course consider it properly.
My hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate also proposed new clause 18 that would increase the maximum sentence for the prescribed limit drink-driving offence to two years’ imprisonment. The United Kingdom already has the toughest drink-driving penalties in Europe. Sir Peter North’s 2010 review of drink and drug-driving law examined the penalty regime and did not identify any evidence that would support that increase in the maximum sentence. The Government are not aware of any new evidence that has come to light since the North report was published.
The Government consider that the existing offence framework is sufficient and appropriate, and ensures that those who ought not to be on the roads are removed from them. Where more serious offences are committed—such as where others are hurt or killed—other relevant offences could be pursued. I do not want to suggest in any way that the Government are complacent about or insufficiently vigilant in the face of such matters. We want to make our roads as safe as possible, but it is worth noting that Britain has some of the safest roads anywhere in Europe and the western world. That is due to responsible social attitudes but also the fact that the legal framework in place has been shown to be effective. I understand, however, why people involved in each individual case and each individual tragedy would feel strongly about these matters.
Amendments 89 and 90 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Bury North (Mr Nuttall) bring me to the subject of public order offences. I suggest that the amendments would limit the police’s ability to deal with those who can be shown to be intentionally provoking violence, causing others to fear violence, or causing harassment, alarm or distress to others. They would do that by removing the word “insulting” from the offences under sections 4 and 4A of the Public Order Act 1986.
My hon. Friend may see the amendments as a helpful intervention to bring those sections of the 1986 Act into line with the amendment to section 5 of that Act set out in clause 42, but that would be a mistake as it would ignore the thorough consideration, consultation and debate undertaken by the Government, both here and in the other place, before agreeing to reform section 5. It would also ignore the significant differences between the section 5 offence and the more serious offences described in sections 4 and 4A. This is not just a tidying-up exercise; sections 4 and 4A are materially different from section 5. Offences under sections 4 and 4A require proof of intent to cause harm to another person, and proof that harassment, alarm or distress was both intended and actually caused to another person. The intent and harm caused are the differentiating features of those offences, rather than the likely effect of the words used or behaviour involved.
Using insulting words that cause someone to fear violence against them, or that have the deliberate intention of causing harassment, alarm or distress, is a far more serious matter than the section 5 offence in which the perpetrator might not intend to cause harassment, alarm or distress, and indeed none might have been caused. In the Government’s view, using insulting words or behaviour in the context of sections 4 or 4A oversteps the line between freedom of speech and the freedom of someone
to live in peace and safety. The line must be drawn somewhere, and the Government believe it right to draw it between sections 4A and 5.
Furthermore, during the long-running campaign that culminated in clause 42, one key argument put forward by those seeking to remove “insulting” from section 5 of the 1986 Act was that removal would not have a negative impact on minority groups. The reasoning behind that was that the police have more appropriate powers available to deal with such unacceptable behaviour under sections 4 and 4A of the 1986 Act. Having accepted that argument as part of the reasoning behind the removal of “insulting” from section 5, it seems perverse to remove the protections to minorities provided by the “insulting” limb in sections 4 and 4A.
In summary, for reasons that I hope I have explained to the satisfaction of the House, the Government are not persuaded of the case for making the same change to section 4 and 4A offences that clause 42 makes to the section 5 offence.
Finally, I ought to speak briefly to the single Government amendment in this group, amendment 84, which provides for the enhanced householder defence provisions in clause 30 to come into force on Royal Assent. Clause 30 is designed to give householders greater latitude to protect themselves in those terrifying circumstances when they are confronted by intruders in their homes. We recognise that it is unusual, although not unprecedented, to commence provisions of this nature on Royal Assent. We would usually allow a gap of at least two months between Royal Assent and commencement, to allow the enforcement agencies time to prepare. However, in this case we are anxious to avoid any unnecessary delay in delivering a coalition commitment and, more important, a tangible enhancement of the protection that householders have to defend themselves. The Government have discussed the amendment with the police and the Crown Prosecution Service, which are content with clause 30 being commenced on Royal Assent. We think the public would find it difficult to understand why commencement had been delayed beyond Royal Assent, particularly if a householder was attacked by an intruder in the intervening period while acting to protect themselves or family members, but could not rely on the heightened householder defence.
For all the reasons I have set out, I would invite Opposition Members and my hon. Friends the Members for Enfield, Southgate and for Bury North not to press their amendments. I recognise that I cannot provide the House with all the practical details of the methods that police forces will use to test for drug-driving, but we are at the broad legislative phase, not the practical implementation phase. I can assure the House that we will no doubt discuss such practical considerations in due course, but they are not necessary to approve the proposed legislation before us.