After that interesting debate about the basis for the important reforms that are taking place to strengthen the scrutiny, and perhaps some of the principles behind measures in the Bill relating to the parliamentary ISC, we will now consider a number of amendments that touch on procedural matters relating to the functions and operation of the ISC. I apologise to the House in advance that I will touch on a range of different points. I know that a number of other amendments have been grouped for this debate, so I will touch briefly on those and then reflect on points made in the debate. If time allows, I hope to respond to any further points that may arise.
Amendments 56 and 57 were originally tabled on Report in the other place and Lord Taylor highlighted that one possible consequence of the change in the Bill to refer to the Intelligence and Security Committee “of Parliament” could be that the ISC would have the power to take evidence on oath. However, further analysis concluded that the consequence of changing the ISC to a statutory Committee of Parliament would be that the ISC may, in future, take evidence on oath. Our view was that, when taken together, the Parliamentary Witnesses Oaths Act 1871, which concerns the power of Committees of the House of Commons to administer oaths, and its Lords equivalent, the Parliamentary Witnesses Act 1858, would give the ISC the authority to administer oaths.
However, the House services raised a concern with the Government about that provision and disagreed with our analysis that the change to “of Parliament” would give the ISC the authority to take evidence on oath. They believe that the Bill should contain an express power for the ISC to take such evidence. Following
further discussions in response to that point, and with the intent of putting this issue beyond doubt, we have decided to address the concern of the parliamentary authorities by tabling amendment 57, which puts the ISC’s power to take evidence on oath beyond doubt.
The amendment makes it unnecessary to specify in the Bill who has the power to administer oaths on behalf of the ISC, as there is no longer any need to displace the provision in the relevant statutory authorities. Amendment 56 makes procedure in relation to the ISC hearing evidence on oath a matter for the ISC to determine, pursuant to paragraph 2(1) of schedule 1.
An amendment was agreed in Committee that places restrictions on the ISC’s ability to publish material that it receives in connection with the exercise of its functions, other than through its reports. We had a useful debate in Committee, which highlighted some of the issues and challenges and recognised the need for safeguards to ensure that sensitive material was not inadvertently disclosed, as well as the need for the ISC to be able to fulfil its duties.
The amendment addresses a consequence of the ISC being a statutory Committee of Parliament. In that context, the ISC will have a general power to publish information, which will sit alongside its express power to publish reports to Parliament. Absent the restriction, which is now contained in paragraph 5 of schedule 1 to the Bill, under that general power the ISC would have been able to publish evidence it has received other than through its reports to Parliament. Following concerns raised by my hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), I was able to provide assurance that it was not the Government’s intention that the amendment would inhibit or limit some of the existing practices of the ISC, and made a commitment to look at the language to see whether there was any way of giving further assurance. I have considered that matter and, as a consequence, we have tabled amendment 60.
Amendment 60 would provide a further gateway allowing publication or disclosure where the Prime Minister and the ISC agree that this would not cause prejudice to the functions of the agencies or other Government security and intelligence bodies. This is the same criterion that is used in clause 3(4) of the Bill which allows the Prime Minister, after consultation with the ISC, to require that the ISC must exclude a matter from any report to Parliament.
The consequence of amendment 60 therefore would be that the ISC would be able to publish informally—for example, in an open letter—any information which, ultimately, it would be permitted to include in its reports to Parliament. As I have said, the criteria are exactly the same. I recognise the concern to ensure that the existing arrangements for the ISC and the steps that it takes are maintained, and that is in part reflected in amendment 73, tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) with the support—I believe—of the existing members of the ISC. While I am sympathetic to the intentions, and have had several discussions with my right hon. and learned Friend to work out some suitable language to address the issues, our view of amendment 73 is that it would
have some unintended consequences. In its current form, the amendment would widen the net in a way that I suspect the ISC had not anticipated.
I shall return to the principle after I have gone through some of the technical issues that have been identified. The amendment refers to information received by the ISC
“from a person subject to the Official Secrets Act 1989.”
While I appreciate the intention behind the amendment, that phrase suggests that the prohibition should apply to any person inside or outside Government who had ever known, or been in a position to know, any classified information. Unfortunately, the effect of the amendment would be slightly different. The Official Secrets Act 1989 contains prohibitions of general application, most notably in section 5, and it extends to the whole UK. It even apparently covers some acts done outside the UK by British citizens or Crown servants. It would therefore cover information beyond the purview and structure anticipated. It would cover all information supplied by a person who has, at any time, been in a position to have access to classified information. Information supplied to the ISC by such a person will be covered by the prohibition whether or not it is in fact classified information, and whether or not it even came to that person in connection with the role in which they had or could have had access to classified information.
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