As Chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee, I will concentrate my comments on the proposed reforms of the ISC in part 1 of the Bill.
It is easy for me and the Committee to welcome part 1, because 95% of it is exactly what we recommended to the Government many months ago. We pay tribute to them for being willing to accept such a radical change in the powers relating to independent oversight in the United Kingdom. The system has been imperfect since 1994, as has been commented on in the past. I can say with confidence that if the proposals in part 1 are implemented, the United Kingdom will have a system of independent intelligence oversight with the powers that are necessary to make it effective. It will be one of the most powerful systems of independent oversight in the western world.
It is worth remembering for a moment why independent oversight is crucial in an open society. Our intelligence agencies have and need to have powers which, if used by other citizens, would be a breach of the criminal law. Given that situation, the agencies are the first to acknowledge that it is essential in a parliamentary democracy for there to be not only Government accountability, but accountability to Parliament and the public. The agencies use some £2 billion of resources. That is a lot of money and it has to be justified, particularly in difficult times.
From time to time, it will be necessary, as it has been in the past, to criticise the agencies when something foolish, unwise or unacceptable takes place. However, the agencies also appreciate that the power of genuine, independent oversight means that they can be defended if, as happens occasionally, they are unfairly criticised or attacked and cannot defend themselves. For obvious reasons, if the Government try to defend them, there is seen to be a potential conflict of interests. That does not apply in the case of genuine, independent oversight. For example, in the 7/7 bombings inquiry, the Intelligence and Security Committee was able to point to some of the unfair accusations that were being made.
What are the reforms that are crucial in transforming the role of independent oversight in the United Kingdom? First, until now—including as I speak—the Intelligence and Security Committee has been a committee of parliamentarians, but not a Committee of Parliament. That is going to change. For the first time, the last word on whether the proposed members of the Committee are acceptable will be with the House of Commons and the House of Lords. As has been said, the Chairman of the Committee will in future be appointed not by the Prime Minister, as I was, but by the Committee itself.
The Committee will report to Parliament. At the moment, it reports to the Prime Minister and only through the Prime Minister do its reports reach this place. Some redactions will, of course, be necessary. There will be occasions, as there have been in the past, when the ISC reports on such sensitive matters that it will, in practice, report only to the Prime Minister because the material overwhelmingly cannot come into the public domain. Nevertheless, for the first time, we will have a parliamentary Committee that is parliamentary in the sense of other Committees, except where the need for the respect of secret information continues to require some differences of treatment.
The second major change is in relation to operations. I will differ slightly from my right hon. and learned Friend the Minister without Portfolio in saying that the extent to which the Intelligence and Security Committee has already been involved, through agreement with the agencies, in looking at operations and sensitive material is not exceptional or occasional, but substantial. Nevertheless, there has been no statutory basis to it. That is crucial, because operations are what the agencies are about to a considerable degree and are where parliamentary and public concern can be most manifest. It is profoundly unsatisfactory that, until now, there has been no meaningful statutory role for the Committee in relation to operations.