The practical effect of the Bill is exactly as my hon. Friend recommends, although it may have been drafted with a few too many provisos and provisions because of the deep suspicion with which these things are regarded. Essentially, however, we do not think that Norwich Pharmacal should apply to intelligence material provided in confidence to the British security services.
I will not take too long on this because the argument is perfectly straightforward, but I want to tell the House that these are not false fears. Over the past year, we have picked up concerns from human agents. They have always been concerned about the degree to which their relationships can be protected, of course, but they are now becoming really concerned about disclosure to the British courts. Sir Daniel Bethlehem, a former legal adviser to the Foreign Office, told the Joint Committee on Human Rights that the flow of intelligence from the
United States was being limited. He said that he did not want to exaggerate, but the point was that the trust of the United States had been weakened and that trust needed to be restored.
Arguments tend to break out as to whether agents have any reason to be fearful, but that is not totally the point. As long as, as a result of hearing about the extraordinary process called Norwich Pharmacal, other intelligence agencies and our agents think that there is always a risk of disclosure by the British courts, the damage is done. To follow the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mark Field), what on earth are we running that risk for?