Health and Social Care Bill

My Lords, I intervene briefly. I listened carefully to what the noble Lord said, but I am not sure that this is just a matter of practice, as he said at the beginning—although by the end he was coming very firmly round to the view that he was an all-out opponent of the legislation itself. I think that there are questions of principle here as well, and not just the principles that he enunciated. I am not a member of the ““keep everything secret”” brigade—rather the opposite. If we had taken more notice of the Information Commissioner's report in 2006 on the unlawful trade in professional information, we might not have had to wait until 2012 for the inquiry into phone hacking, and the rest. I also argued against the 30-year rule for the disclosure of Cabinet papers as wrong and unnecessary and remain critical of the previous Government's response to that, which to reduce it to 20 rather than 15 years, as recommended. I think that had more to do with disclosure on Iraq than it did a matter of principle. I also believe that when it comes to the publication of risk registers, other issues need to be taken into account, not least the relationship between Ministers and civil servants. I suggest that this is why no Government in the past has agreed to a policy of publication. In my view, Ministers are responsible for the decisions taken, and it is for civil servants to advise. That is their skill and their role, and anyone who has ever put a Bill through Parliament knows well enough that if they are any good, civil servants do not simply sit there saying, ““Yes, Minister””. They debate and argue with the Minister and warn of the risks as they see them. It is one of the very good features of the relationship between Ministers and the Civil Service in this country. The problem with publishing all the risks, from the possible to the highly improbable, is that the relationship itself seems to be brought into some doubt. Civil servants, whether they liked it or not, would be dragged into the debate. We all know exactly what would happen: the risk register would be used to undermine the measure being proposed. The aim would be to show that Ministers were in conflict with their own staff. The opponents of a Bill such as the one before us today could say that not only was the BMA against the Bill—it is not exactly news that the BMA is against any new measure put forward since 1947—but also, by selective quotation, that the Civil Service itself had profound doubts. Whether one liked it or not, the Civil Service would be brought into controversy and people would try to portray conflict. I do not see, frankly, how that is in the public interest. The party opposite has not shown any interest or inclination in the past to go down this road as a general policy line. This would simply place new obstacles in the way of legislation and change. I wonder how a risk register could have been used at the inception of the health service in the 1940s. Doubtless it would have pointed to the problems implicit in such a massive reorganisation and to the risks that costs could escalate. Not every civil servant would have shared ministerial confidence that a better health service would mean improved health and therefore a reduction in costs. It comes down to the fact that in these cases there is a matter of judgment on the part of Ministers, having listened to the arguments and the advice of the Civil Service, in putting their proposals before Parliament. I entirely understand the later amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, which seeks to deny a Third Reading to this Bill. That is perfectly straightforward: she sets out the reasons for it. I do not happen to agree with her, as she knows, but I do not have any doubt about her right to this. Frankly, however, I cannot see the value of this amendment seeking delay on grounds that I do not believe to be in the public interest.