Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

My Lords, let me begin with the comments of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Exeter. The worst-case scenario for me would be if this Government lost control of the economy and were forced by circumstances to come back with even more draconian cuts in public expenditure than those that we were forced to make when we came into office, and which the Labour Government in their last months were also planning. That is the reality, a reality that has been faced by every department of government. If we had not taken those tough decisions, we could indeed be facing that worst-case scenario in which control of the economy was lost and even more draconian cuts were asked of our citizens. I recall saying that I would reflect on what was said in Committee. I have done so, and so has my right honourable friend the Secretary of State. I must say that the more I have reflected on it, the less convinced I have been by the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. Many speeches—although I do not accuse the noble Lord, Lord Hart, of this—have wandered very far in the direction of seeing access to justice as a concept of legal aid blank cheques signed by the taxpayer. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, will say, ““Ah, but look at my amendment. See the limitations that I recognise””. Once you have said that there are limits to expenditure, some of the high-flown phrases used by the noble Lord, Lord Clinton-Davis, or the noble Baroness, Lady Mallalieu, have to be run up against that hard decision. You are drawing lines. You are not giving everyone access to justice financed by the taxpayer. We are trying today to see, as my noble friend Lord Thomas said, whether the amendment adds anything to our debate. Amendment 1 relates to the supply of and demand for legal services. I accept that its purpose is very similar to the purpose for community legal services in Section 4(1) of the Access to Justice Act 1999. I also accept that the duty that the amendment would place on the Lord Chancellor would be qualified by the reference to the duty being subject both to the resources available and to the provisions of Part 1. However, against the backdrop of the Bill, we believe that Amendment 1 is unnecessary and inappropriate in the context of Part 1. The provision in the Access to Justice Act relates to how civil legal aid operates on an exclusionary basis. By that I mean that it specifies what services cannot be funded under civil legal aid and leaves open the question of services that might be funded. In that context, a provision such as that in Section 4(1) of that Act, which provides a basis for determining which services might be funded, is a useful and appropriate addition where those services are undefined. However, in the context of the Bill, the amendment is not appropriate. The provisions of Part 1 that relate to the general scope of civil legal aid are drafted on an inclusionary basis, where the services capable of being funded under civil legal aid are detailed explicitly in Schedule 1. As such, there is no question as to what services might be funded; they are in the Bill for all to see. Consequently, the amendment based on Section 4(1) of the Access to Justice Act is not appropriate. That tension—some would say contradiction—is underlined by the amendment itself, the intention of which is to make the provision subject to the wider provisions of Part 1, which of course includes Schedule 1 and its description of the range of services to be funded under civil legal aid. We therefore believe that the amendment is not appropriate in the context of the Bill. Outside those technical and definitional issues, the debate has raised questions about whether there should be a duty on the Lord Chancellor to secure access to justice. I shall briefly explain why we think that that is also unnecessary in the context of the Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, quoted the Guardian article of my right honourable friend. I repeat again that the Government consider that the rule of law and access to justice are a fundamental part of a properly functioning democracy and an important element in our constitutional balance. It is true that the legal aid reforms are aimed in part at achieving savings. In our view, the current legal aid system is unaffordable, has expanded far beyond its original scope and is not sustainable in its present form—as I think was recognised by the Labour Party when it referred to cuts in legal aid in its election manifesto. However, the reforms are also aimed at encouraging people to use non-adversarial solutions to resolve their problems where appropriate and to speed up and simplify court processes where not. As such, we consider that our reforms should strengthen the rule of law by making the justice system more effective. The Government believe that financial assistance from the state in accessing the courts is justified in certain areas, and that is why we have retained categories of cases within the scope of civil legal aid. I noticed that the noble Lord said that there was no social welfare spending on legal aid but that is simply not true, as he knows. We have also made provision for legal aid to be granted in the limited circumstances justifying exceptional funding under Clause 9. The exceptional funding scheme will ensure the protection of an individual's rights to legal aid under the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as rights to legal aid that are directly enforceable under European Union law. The Government do not dispute that it is a principle of law that every citizen has an unimpeded right of access to a court. However, they do not accept the proposition that there is a constitutional right to legal aid in all circumstances and at all times. Once that is conceded, the debate is about how and where we draw the line. The Government consider that the common law right, as mentioned by my noble friend Lord Thomas, of unimpeded access to a court of law means having the assistance of the court to assert legal rights and obtain remedies to which one is entitled, having the right to challenge a decision in the courts if one wishes to do so, and not being prevented from issuing court proceedings because of an inability to pay the court fee. The noble Lord, Lord Alton, and others seemed to be moving very close to arguing for a legal aid scheme at the point of need—a kind of National Health Service for the legal profession. I think I have mentioned before that I talked to Jeremy Hutchison—Lord Hutchison—who is on leave of absence from this House and is now in his 90s. He was one of the lawyers who made up the legal aid scheme. He said, ““Our ambition was a National Health Service for the legal system””. However, the truth is that successive Governments have backed far away from that ambitious concept. Although I know that the noble Lord, Lord Bach, would have made savings in other parts of legal aid, even the Opposition have said that there would be limits to legal aid. The noble Lord, Lord Clinton-Davis, said that he was brought into the legal profession by the idea of access to justice. However, even when he came into the legal profession, and every day that he was in the legal profession, the kind of access to justice that he was referring to was never available. Access to justice with legal aid has always been restricted. We have always had to draw lines and we always will, as he well knows.