Welfare Reform Bill

My Lords, in moving this amendment in lieu, I am all too painfully conscious of the unavoidable absence of my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern. I am equally aware that on the occasion when he moved his amendment, which was dramatically endorsed by this House with an eloquent and decisive majority, I myself was unable to attend, not as a matter of self-absenting but because I was then engaged in Strasbourg on parliamentary duties with the Council of Europe. I seek to rectify that omission not only by studying the past amendment but by returning to the case which was so eloquently put by my noble and learned friend on an amendment to which, for the record, I had been a co-signatory. We have subsequently discussed the course of events. I also say for the avoidance of doubt that I have no difficulty at all with the alternative amendment in lieu, which is being put forward by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. This is one of the most difficult areas of social policy. Successive Secretaries of State, from my noble friend Lord Newton of Braintree—whom I have known for many years and with whom I have discussed this matter in extenso—onwards, regardless of their politics, have been united in their inability to find a satisfactory answer to situations where parental relations have broken down or where any suggestion of maintenance is aggravating that breakdown. We are all trying to find an approach which overcomes this. I say to the higher students of these matters that this is now my third version of an amendment in an effort to get some thoughts right. We want to meet the case of substance: how to help parents with care and their children. At the same time, we do not want to impose significant strain on the public finances or, taking up the point that the Minister made in explaining the case tonight, to set any perverse incentive towards intransigence on the part of either parent concerned. I know that Ministers are as anxious to avoid that as we all are. The case for excluding any charge on parents with care in cases where collaboration is clearly impossible was summarised by my noble and learned friend Mackay of Clashfern in a single sentence: "““I do not believe that it is fair to require them to pay charges when they are not responsible for creating the need for the use of the service””." He continued by explaining: "““The obligation to maintain children … subsists for so long as the child needs maintenance and the parent lives””.—[Official Report, 25/1/12; col. 1090.]" He added that this is a completely separate issue from other matters; for example, the issue of contact. I should also like to pick up the words of my noble friend Lord De Mauley, the Minister, who said: "““At the heart of the new scheme will be tough enforcement and collection measures when parents fail to pay maintenance””.—[Official Report, 25/1/12; col. 1083.]" I add to that my gloss that he was emphasising the parental failure to pay maintenance, not the failure to receive maintenance. The emphasis rightly of this House and its thinking is on pursuit of the delinquent absent parent, not on imposing charges on parents with care, which would therefore be netted off against their children’s maintenance entitlement. To some extent I agree, as I did at the time, with the Henshaw report’s recommendations on charging for what is a very expensive public service. However, I am anxious to spare those who suffer from non-compliance rather than those who perpetrate it. That is quite separate from wider issues about who was responsible for the failure of the relationship or other matters that are, if not responsibility of the courts, then maybe of the sociologists—so I shall leave that aside. This is simply about who is paying or not paying or complying with the system. It follows that the Government, frankly, need to make a clearer case than they have done for their reason for proposing charging a collection fee—we are no longer talking about the gateway fee where they pay in advance—on the parent with care as well as the parent who is due to pay maintenance. At the very least, even if the principle were conceded, why should such a fee be set at a substantial indicative level? The suggestion, although it is not set in stone, is that it should be in the range of 7 to 12 per cent of the available maintenance. It is self-evident that on the kinds of sum involved this is a matter of several hundred pounds a year knocked off. The danger as I see it is that either the charge will be set so high as materially to affect the maintenance payable or conversely, if we argue it down, so low as not really to be worth charging in the first place. I should like to offer the House a number of detailed points on this matter. First, I understand that maintenance direct—not a concept well-understood other than by experts—which is clearly a better idea all round is nevertheless adopted by less than 20 per cent of agency cases. In addition, there are all the private arrangements that can now be made and are clearly desirable. However, within the statutory system only 20 per cent of the case load is going through the automatic, no charge, maintenance direct payment. I hope that with improved publicity and the advice structure that is being put in place, we could at least make a start on getting this figure up materially, although one is dealing with some people who have set their minds against this. Secondly, I understand that there would be an option for people to switch in and out of maintenance direct depending on what happened in the course of the maintenance payments. This will need to be very carefully controlled because there could be unscrupulous, absent parents who would use it for future manipulation to the detriment of the parent with care. Thirdly, I am worried about what one might call, from the constituency experience that many of us have had, parents who are outliers—whether they are parents with care or absent parents—and who will want to use the substantial charging system as a further vehicle for their intransigence and as a way of imposing further burdens on their hated ex-partner, even if it is to their detriment as well. Fourthly, I will pass on a thought. Occasionally one’s past experience is useful. As an employer I had once to operate a deduction from earnings order for a civil debt in relation to an employee. In the paperwork, I was surprised to find that I was entitled to—although I never claimed—a modest fee for handling the collection of this sum week by week. Of course, the charge was not imposed on the creditor. It may be that a system whereby the debtor pays for the service but the creditor does not pay to receive the sum owed has some moral bearing on the equity of the case. The amendment in effect offers a new clause that is tied to regulations covering fees charged for the service. The effect would be to provide for the apportionment of fees on a basis to be determined. I have already made my preference clear. It will be for the Minister to argue his case for a split. It would continue to provide an opportunity for fee regulations to enable a complete waiver, so a parent might not pay anything in certain circumstances. This would provide a basis for further discussion. I should like to put on record how much I have appreciated the discussions I have had with the Minister on this issue and how much I have appreciated the general progress of the Welfare Reform Bill. We have been very well served by the dialogue that we had. We have also had the promise of a review in 30 months’ time of how the system is operating. I say to the Minister, with an emphasis on the regulations, which will have to be approved by both Houses, so we are not up against the privilege issue again—this is a free-standing chance to get it right—that I do not want us just to look at this in 30 months’ time and see whether we have it right; I want us to use the process and the time that we now have for intensive discussions and consultations in the run-up to the regulations, in the hope that we can produce, as we have done in other cases, a broad consensus or agreement on how to balance the interests of the various parties. That kind of approach, taken outside the Chamber and at slightly more leisure, will be the best way to serve the interests of innocent parties and the paramount interests of children. Frankly, that is where most of us involved with the amendment started—and it is the clear view of the House. In that spirit, I beg to move.