Welfare Reform Bill

This is paid over to lone parents as a group. That is what we are paying over to lone parents. Some of them have been bereaved, but the bulk of them have not. All of them could look to get support from the non-resident parent, whether or not they had lived with them at one stage. That is the figure I am trying to explain. All of them could look to get some maintenance. Is it unfair or unreasonable to ask for a small contribution to the cost of running a child maintenance system against a backdrop of that financial support? I remind noble Lords that, as Frank Field said, there is no offset any more; it is money on top; it is disregarded. A lot of the debate we had when CSA started in the 1990s and was so controversial, and in the early 2000s, was framed by the concept that it was money going from the non-resident to the Treasury. Between 2000 and 2010, we moved to a 100 per cent disregard. That is the fundamental difference of which I remind noble Lords. The next point is that we have committed to reviewing the charging powers and laying the review before Parliament 30 months after introduction. That is to ensure that we are able to test properly whether the intended incentive effects of the charges are realised and that we get the behavioural impact of the charging regime. Again, simply, we are looking at a 1:2 charging regime in round terms, which is intended to incentivise both sides to reach agreement between them rather than going through the state system as the first option. One reason that it is so important that we encourage both sides to go independently is because research tells us that the children are better off if the parents can agree between them rather than using the state system. I, and the Government, have the utmost respect for my noble and learned friend, Lord Mackay, and the intention behind the original amendment laid on charging for child maintenance services. The problem of asking for a test to establish when the parent with care has gone through a process is that it may not be a real test—anyone can say, ““Yes, I have been through a process””. If that is the case, we will end up with everyone using the system as the first option. If it is a real test, we will have to go through all the work of checking whether they have made efforts and the rights and wrongs, and we will be pulled down the slippery slope that we are so keen to avoid. Because we would be pulling people into the system, that would have a substantial cost because of the pure volumes. Charging must have a role in the new system to ensure that we do not repeat the failings of the CSA. The proposed charges create an incentive for parents to collaborate and take responsibility. As a direct result of the concerns expressed in this House, we have also changed the fees to enter the system, to avoid the parent with care being deterred from using the state system. We have announced that we are reducing the maximum charge from £100 to £20 across the piece to ensure that it is not a potential barrier to entry. We are offering a very good service for that £20 in that we will be looking at the non-resident parent’s earnings, and that will be a real benefit for the parent with care. With regard to reducing the maximum charge and completing the review, when we know how the system has shaken out we can ask whether we have got the figures right and whether the charges are right. That is the point of the review: we can ask whether we are getting the behavioural responses that we need. I hope that I have laid out the issues adequately. I beg to move. Motion H1 had been substituted by Motion H1A. Motion H1A (as an amendment to Motion H) Moved by