Health and Social Care Bill

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and all noble Lords who have spoken in another excellent debate. I understand the arguments that have been put forward in favour of these amendments. It is important for me to say at the outset that the Government’s general approach is to allow the NHS Commissioning Board as much autonomy as possible in determining its own membership, structures and procedures. It is our firm view that the board is the body best placed to determine how to organise itself in the most effective and efficient way. We would not want to undermine that. It is also worth restating that, looking across government, it is the responsibility of all departments to ensure that public appointments to arm's-length bodies are open, transparent and made on merit. However, it is not government policy for such appointments to be subject to Select Committee approval—in this case the Health Select Committee. These are ministerial appointments. The Secretary of State is ultimately accountable to Parliament for the performance of the health service as a whole, as we have made clear through amendments to the Bill. The current process under which some posts are subject to pre-appointment hearings by a House Select Committee does not represent a power of veto, which the amendment would amount to. Of course, noble Lords will be aware that we followed this process, as the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, reminded us, in the recent appointment of Professor Malcolm Grant as the chair of the NHS Commissioning Board Authority. When we discussed this last in Committee, I was pleased that the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, said that he thought that this process ensured proper and effective scrutiny of that appointment. I gently wish to hold him to that view. He raised the comparison of the Office for Budget Responsibility, saying that the NHS Commissioning Board was just as important. Importance is not the issue. The Office for Budget Responsibility has a unique role because it has dual accountability to both government and Parliament directly. The NHS Commissioning Board is accountable to government and, through Ministers, to Parliament, which is somewhat different. I turn to Amendments 21, 21A and 22. We recognise that the Bill strikes a fine balance between giving the board as much autonomy as possible in how it operates, and providing the necessary accountability. It is important to strike that balance accurately and consistently. If we were so prescriptive in the Bill as to set out further requirements for the board's membership, we would be moving too far away from that necessary autonomy. It is right that it should be up to the board to decide whether it has a vice-chair or a senior independent director, as Amendment 21 suggests. Of course, a vice-chair or deputy chair, were they to be appointed, would have to be non-executive. Likewise, while I agree that it will be key to the effectiveness of the board for it to involve and obtain sufficient advice and input from public health experts, and to have public health well within its purview, it would not be right to specify that it must have a public health specialist as a member, as Amendment 21A proposes. Again, I am sorry to disappoint my noble friend Lady Williams in particular, but we think that the board will be best placed to determine whether it has the right structure and range of skills, knowledge and experience appropriate to the issues that it will face. In the material that David Nicholson published he made it clear that, rather than making token appointments, he intends that clinical leadership will run right through the organisation. That is a very reassuring statement. Amendment 22 takes the Secretary of State out of the loop of appointing the chief executive. That moves us too far away from one of the key principles that most of us have signed up to: the necessary accountability of the board to the Secretary of State. It also seems at odds with the ethos of other amendments proposed by the noble Lord, such as Amendment 19, which we debated on the first day of Report and which sought to make every other aspect of the exercise of the board's functions subject to direction from the Secretary of State.