Health and Social Care Bill

My Lords, I trust that my noble friend will not object if I claim at least parliamentary paternity of Amendment 21A—influenced, I must say, by the Faculty of Public Health and others interested in the public health dimension of the Bill. The Faculty of Public Health is a very respectable body, characterised, along with other opponents or critics of the Bill, by Mr Simon Burns, the Minister of State for Health, as zombies, a term that I cannot imagine emerging from the lips of the noble Earl. It is concerned about the degree to which the public health service and its interests and needs will be reflected in the structures that are being created. That interest is shared by the Health Select Committee. The Health Select Committee also referred to its recommendation that the local director of public health should be a member of each clinical commissioning group. Having regard to the number of clinical commissioning groups, that is possibly asking a little much, although it would be sensible for clinical commissioning groups to consult the director or his representative from time to time in the course of their work. However, my noble friend is absolutely right to stress the importance of having a qualified public health professional on the national Commissioning Board. Public health is an enormously significant area of public policy, and we will discuss other aspects of it later this evening and subsequently during Report. The Health Select Committee was very clear that there should be a qualified public health professional on the NHS Commissioning Board and that the Commissioning Board should routinely take advice from qualified public health professionals when taking commissioning decisions. The Government’s response to the Select Committee’s report is, to put it mildly, not very encouraging. While the board will be required to obtain clinical advice from a broad range of professionals, including those in public health—and the Government have stated their intention that there should be clinical and professional leadership on the board—they state explicitly that, "““it is an important principle … that it””—" that is, the board— "““should have autonomy of decision-making on matters such as its own membership and its structures and procedures, as far as possible, to determine how best to exercise its functions””.—[Official Report, 14/11/11; col. 514.]" That seems, frankly, to put an unnecessary degree of power in the hands of the national Commissioning Board. It again raises the issues of accountability that my noble friend dealt with so well earlier this evening. It is surely not acceptable to permit an organisation with this degree of power and influence—and, indeed, with the substantial resources at its disposal—simply to decide on its own membership, particularly when public health is not just a health service or Department of Health issue but goes much wider than that. It is important that those wider implications of the work of public health, which we will touch on later, are reflected in the board’s deliberations as a matter of course. I hope that the Government will take the strong advice of the Health Select Committee and reconsider this position. I have no doubt that there will be a queue of other organisations wanting a place on the national Commissioning Board, but this is, in a sense, a unique function because of its reach into other areas of policy and administration, including, for that matter, other government departments. That voice, reflecting all those interests, is not likely to be represented directly in the way that other clinical interests probably will be in relation to the board. Therefore, I strongly support Amendment 21A, as well as the other amendments in the name of my noble friend. I hope that the Government will see their way to rethinking this matter and come back at Third Reading with a different position.