Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

My Lords, where but in the Lords would we be having such a wonderful debate, run through with humanity, after 10 o’clock at night? I acknowledge noble Lords’ support for the principle of restorative justice. The Government are indeed committed to delivering greater use of restorative practices across the criminal justice system. It is one of our key priorities. For example, we have already begun providing more than £1 million-worth of funding to youth offending teams, probation trusts and prisons for restorative justice training and practice standards, and we are currently setting up neighbourhood justice panels based on restorative principles. It is excellent to have noble Lords’ support for restorative justice. However, the Government believe that the amendments are unnecessary, although we are sympathetic to the intentions behind them. On the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord, Lord Ponsonby, as I think he realises from what he said in his speech, a court already has sufficient powers under the existing requirements of the youth rehabilitation order and community order to make restorative justice activity a formal part of those orders. The activity requirement allows the court to consider the use of restorative justice where it has been advised that the victim and offender have agreed to take part and provision is in place to deliver such a requirement. The amendments make no provision for ensuring that both the offender and the victim are completely prepared to participate in a restorative justice process. That is crucial to the restorative ethos and to prevent victimisation, but I understand what the noble Lord is aiming at. Turning to Amendment 172DAA in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, the courts already have powers to adjourn sentencing for the provision of restorative justice to be undertaken if they believe it will inform the sentencing process. I hope that the noble and learned Lord will be reassured that the Government are looking at taking that process further to allow for restorative outcomes to help inform the courts as to what appropriate sentence should be handed down. However, the amendments do not contain sufficient safeguards to prevent the ineffective use of remand resources to adjourn sentencing and hold offenders in custody in cases where the victim does not want to participate. The amendments also do not seek to impose a restriction on the length of remand, which poses additional risks not only to delay in court time but also around the proportionality of remanding an offender in custody for a significant length of time without sentencing. Therefore it is much better for the courts to retain discretion to decide when and in what circumstances restorative justice can be effectively undertaken, although we understand people's concern to ensure that it is high on the agenda. In practice, that would most likely need to be in cases where the court has already been notified of the willingness of both the victim and the offender to participate in the restorative justice process. As I mentioned, it is crucial that the victim should have the opportunity to consider and undertake restorative justice if they so wish, and the offender must also be completely willing to participate—which the clause does not provide for. Any circumstances in which the offender is not completely prepared to participate in restorative justice—which cannot be signalled simply by a guilty plea—presents serious risks for the victim being revictimised because the offender is falsely or forcibly engaged in the process. We have heard a great deal about the potential of this approach, which is of course very encouraging. Before we can make any determination as to whether further, specific legislation is necessary for restorative justice, we must make significant steps to build capacity to deliver it. Once we have begun to make greater strides in embedding restorative justice across the system and helping areas to put necessary provisions in place, we will reflect carefully both on whether to widen the application of restorative justice using the law and on how to do so, if it proves necessary to take this approach. Although I understand noble Lords’ enthusiasm to enshrine this now in statute, there is work to do before we reach such a stage—persuasive though noble Lords undoubtedly are, and we certainly agree with their principles. Although we share a common interest in the increased use of restorative justice, at this stage I nevertheless urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.