Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

My Lords, this has been an extremely useful debate and one that has not necessarily followed previous structures where the Minister sits there under fire from all parts of the House. It has been interesting to hear the various experiences, particularly of noble and learned Lords and their opinions on whether the amendments are necessary or add to present practice. The Criminal Justice Act 2003 sets out when a court must or should request a report. Amendment 175 does not address those provisions, which relate to the duty to explain a sentence after it has been decided. A pre-sentence report is designed to inform the judge or magistrate before they decide on a sentence, while the clause relates to duties to explain the sentence that is being imposed. Nevertheless, under the system now in place, a pre-sentence report to the court by the probation service sets out a recommendation for sentence based on the background and the risk posed by the offender. The report will set out any factors relevant to the offending. That will include a history of alcohol or drug dependency or any home life factors that might be relevant. That report is, in effect, what one would understand by the term ““social history””. Of course, the court would also have in front of it a print-out of previous convictions and it would decide which of these were relevant to the case. The law on the disclosure of previous convictions is a separate subject and contains safeguards to ensure that irrelevant convictions are not considered. The judge in a case will—indeed, must—consider relevant and recent convictions when sentencing. This is in Section 143(2) of the Criminal Justice Act. On the points about stalking, as was mentioned, the report has come out only today and it would be wrong for me to give an instant response on it or on its relevance to this matter. However, having listened to the debate, I should like to look at the amendment again and perhaps, between now and Report, talk to the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, and the other noble Lords in whose names it stands. Amendment 176 would place a duty on sentencers to consider the effects of sentences on the offender’s dependants. I noticed that the noble Baroness, Lady Corston, was in her place a little earlier. I have pointed out on previous occasions that we in the Ministry of Justice still keep her report as the guideline on the treatment of women offenders. The budget, which I shall not go into again, is a constraint, but we are trying to take forward many of her recommendations. Although I understood what the noble Lord, Lord Clinton-Davis, said and I appreciated his helpful intervention, I am firmly convinced that there is a difference with women offenders and there should be a difference in our treatment of them. The fact is that, in deciding on a sentence, the judge or magistrates are required to consider first and foremost the seriousness of the offence. They will also consider any personal mitigating factors relevant to the offender, which can include the impact of a sentence on dependants. The difference that the existence of dependants makes to the type or severity of a sentence, particularly where the offender is the primary carer, has been clarified over the years by decisions of the Court of Appeal. Indeed, the Court of Appeal has clearly established that if a court does not have sufficient information on the consequences of separating a parent from a child, it must ask for more information. In short, it is long established that the courts can, and in certain circumstances must, consider the potential impact of a sentence on dependants. If they did not do so where it was relevant, this could give rise to an appeal against the sentence. In both these debates there has been a desire to put instructions into statute and it is a debate that has continued since I have been in this job. It is a question of how much the legislators want to instruct the judges what to do and how much the judges say, ““Listen, we’re there. We listen to all the evidence and we get the reports. We are best placed to make the judgments””. There will always be that tension between Parliament and the judiciary, but it is a healthy tension. However, I think that in this case the amendment is not a necessary addition to statutory provisions and I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw it.