Welfare Reform Bill

My Lords, let me cut straight to the chase. We have the powers in regulation to do whatever we or any future Government want to do to raise sanctions, so I can provide reassurance to that extent. I will go into a little detail about our plans and what we intend to do, but first I pay tribute to noble Lords because some really interesting and useful ideas were expressed in Committee that we took on board, although I do not think that we took them on board quite as much as some noble Lords would want. We moved a long way and thought about this again more specifically, so I thank noble Lords a lot for that. We are trying to create a sanctions regime to provide at one level—probably the most important—a deterrent against behaviour that damages a claimant’s and indeed others’ employment prospects. Ending sanctions when a claimant complies with requirements can clearly play a role in incentivising sanctioned claimants to do the right thing. That is why we are moving in the direction of open-ended sanctions for lower-level failures, such as the failure to participate in training or to attend work-focused interviews. In essence, these sanctions apply only until the claimant re-complies, with a short fixed period of a week or a few weeks. This amendment is about the higher-level sanctions: sanctions imposed for failing to comply with the most important requirements. These are employment-related failures, such as the failure to apply for a job when specifically asked to do so, the failure to accept a job offer, or the failure to leave employment voluntarily. By failing to do these things for no good reason, a claimant is fundamentally breaking the agreement that sits at the heart of jobseeker’s allowance: that they do everything possible to find work in order to be able to support themselves. That is why we believe it is vital that there are clear consequences for such failures. Fixed, substantive sanctions re-enforce the message that these requirements absolutely must be met. As I said on Report, we propose to wipe the slate clean by terminating any outstanding sanctions once a claimant has moved into employment for six months, but we believe that going further and ending these critical sanctions after a few weeks or months of compliance would undermine the clarity of our message and the effectiveness of the sanctions regime. It is worth noting that in the current system sanctions can be imposed for up to six months and are typically not lifted at all on re-compliance. As I said at the beginning of this debate, we have the powers to end sanctions following re-compliance—we have defined the levels of re-compliance—so if, after a period of live running, we or future Governments wish to change the position, we have the powers to do so. Indeed, this is one area in which it might be very interesting to do some piloting work on how incentives and deterrents actually work. Just to be techie about this, the powers that I mentioned are in this Bill and in the Jobseekers Act 1995. Clause 19(4)(b) provides a broad regulation-making power to set the duration of a sanction. Existing Section 36 of the Jobseekers Act allows for any regulations made under that Act to be subject to particular exceptions. I am not absolutely surprised that no one could piece that together.