Welfare Reform Bill

My Lords, I need to start by thanking the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, for arranging a really useful seminar the other week on a range of issues related to sanctions and penalties. I was equally impressed by the content of that seminar, the iron discipline with which it was conducted and how much ground we managed to cover. We are very keen to draw on the expertise of others as we develop our implementation plans. I look forward to continuing to work with interested groups in this collaborative manner. I gave a commitment in that meeting that we would work collaboratively with the groups involved. I am pleased to repeat formally here that that collaboration will happen. Turning to the substance of the amendment, I hope I have made clear that we are really on the same page on many of these issues. We absolutely agree that clear guidance should be issued to officials making decisions on behalf of the Secretary of State where discretion is exercised. We do this now and will continue to do it under universal credit. Decision-makers will be required to follow this guidance when applying the law to the facts of the case where they consider a decision about a claim, sanctions for non-compliance with work-related requirements, a civil penalty or the recovery of overpayment. As is currently the case, we will make this guidance publicly available. We spoke about the Wednesbury principles at our seminar, and I can reassure noble Lords that the decision-making process is and will continue to be consistent with these fundamental principles of public law. The department strives to ensure that no decision is influenced by irrelevant factors and that decision-makers act in a rational and fair manner, taking into account all relevant matters before exercising a discretion. For example, the primary legislation expressly sets out that a conditionality sanction applies only if there is no good reason for the failure. In determining whether there is such good reason, decision-makers will have to consider all relevant matters raised by the claimant within a particular time period, including information about a claimant’s health condition and financial circumstances. It is worth noting that when it comes to failures to meet work-related requirements, we get the vast majority of the decisions right. In 2010-11, just 0.2 per cent of JSA sanction and disentitlement decisions were overturned at a First-tier Tribunal. Of course, the aim must be to get every decision right. We must ensure that our training and guidance equips advisers and decisions-makers with the tools to understand the circumstances and needs of vulnerable claimants, such as homeless claimants and those with mental health conditions. We must also ensure that the notifications and explanations of decisions to impose sanctions or penalties are clear, straightforward and easy to understand. I accept that there is room for improvement here, and we will make that improvement. I assure noble Lords that, as I have just committed, we will work with stakeholders to ensure that guidance, communication products and decision-making processes are suitably tailored to meet the needs of the range of universal credit claimants. Despite all these points of agreement—and I think that they are agreements on substance—I urge the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment, only because we do not think there is a need to set out a general duty in primary legislation to take into account relevant considerations or to give reasons as part of the decision-making process. Decision-makers clearly have a general duty under public law to make decisions in accordance with the Wednesbury principles, to consider relevant matters raised by a claimant and to explain their decision to claimants. Our training and guidance is designed to ensure that decision-makers adhere to these duties. This amendment would not bring about a change in approach from decision-makers, nor empower claimants to challenge decisions. I therefore urge the noble Lord to withdraw it.