Health and Social Care Bill

My Lords, this is probably not the best time of night to be concentrating on this set of amendments, because it brings us to the difficult and controversial issue of service reconfigurations. Let me start with why I think that we need to move upstream from the full-scale failure regimes which are provided for in this Bill, and with why I do not consider that one can rely totally on local commissioners and elected Health Secretaries to undertake the scale of service reconfiguration that the NHS requires, or as quickly as it requires. In making that statement I start from a position that the best predictor of future behaviour is past behaviour. In the field of service reconfigurations past behaviour has not been a speedy or easy process to start, let alone finish. I do not want to spend long on why it is urgent, but the essence of this is the Nicholson challenge, which is £20 billion of productive improvements in the NHS in the four years to 2015-16. As the Health Select Committee has pointed out, no health system in the developed world has ever delivered this level of productivity. To say that it is a big ask is a masterpiece of understatement. The NHS’s track record on productivity improvement is, putting it at its best, modest, so we are dealing with a difficult set of issues, on top of which there are constant pressures from demography, advances in science and rising public expectations in the UK healthcare system and, indeed, in virtually every advanced healthcare system. That is what confronts the NHS. It is crystal clear that the public and politicians are beginning to recognise more openly that the historic patterns of service provision built around district general hospitals do not meet current or future healthcare needs. They certainly have a capacity to gobble up resources without necessarily delivering the type of services that many patients of the NHS need and which could be delivered more cost-effectively but probably not using the present pattern of hospital configuration. What that means its that we are facing a situation where in many parts of the country we have to change those hospital services very rapidly indeed, and we have to make some painful decisions on those service configurations, which can often mean closing some services, doing some services in a different place, redeploying and retraining staff and, in some cases, in all probability making some staff redundant. That is why this is contentious territory and why it has proven difficult to do. We are now moving towards a financial situation where we cannot put off the job of reconfiguring these services much longer. The difficult problem we have in the way this Bill is structured and in the way we are approaching this is that we are expecting this painful stuff to be done in a situation where we are saying that local clinicians and local people have got to face up to these difficult decisions. They have got to start the process, unless it gets so bad that Monitor is required to trigger a failure regime. In many cases, the problem manifests itself in an acute hospital, but often you cannot solve the problems of that acute hospital without looking at the wider health economy within which it is situated, so we have a situation which is asking quite a lot of local clinicians, certainly based on experience, to start the process of reshaping those services however right it is in principle to expect local people to take the initiative in these areas. Historically, we have faced a situation where elected politicians in the form of MPs have found this extremely difficult territory—whether they are going to be Kidderminstered, or whether they are going to find themselves having a very small majority and feeling honour bound to carry a placard around outside the local hospital without making a change. That is not a criticism of them; that is a fact of life. Asking local elected politicians and local people to, in effect, fall on their sword to some extent in relation to changing these hospital services is a big ask. This amendment tries to face up to some of those realities. It suggests that waiting for things to fail, to get so bad that they trigger the failure regime, is putting Monitor in a pretty tough situation. This amendment tries to move upstream from that and to advance the argument that Monitor, with the support of the national Commissioning Board, should be able to look upstream and see the hospital services that are heading towards failure—in this case, I have taken a period of 12 months before failure—and start to do something about it. In co-operation with the national Commissioning Board, Monitor could trigger an independent panel to work with local people to come up with a set of proposals for reconfiguring services within a reasonable timescale set by Monitor that would make those services sustainable financially and clinically for the future. That is not to say that local people should be excluded but we should have a trigger that brings in some facilitation to help them get there. Fast-forward, then, to the end of that process. We have often talked about the Chase Farm example. Seventeen years is a bit of a long time to sort out an A&E department, but that is what it has taken. My noble friend Lady Wall is still struggling with what comes next. We have to have something better than that. Elected Ministers are also constituency MPs. They understand the problems that some of their colleagues face. Sometimes they even understand the problems that their opposition colleagues face in these situations. It is not surprising that they find it difficult to take decisions quickly, even armed with the current independent review panel. No stone is left unturned in trying to give local people an endless chance to stop progress. We call it public consultation but it is in fact a stopping of progression of the reconfiguration. What my amendment also does is to say, at the end of that process, that the Secretary of State cannot be taken out of the loop, but if he is going to turn down this independent panel’s set of proposals for making services sustainable clinically and financially in a given area, he has got to give his reasons to Parliament for doing that and has to come up with an alternative proposal for making those services sustainable. That is why I think we badly need a process of this kind where there is a trigger, some independent facilitation and some lock on the ability of the Secretary of State to endlessly procrastinate or avoid taking a decision coming out of an independent panel. I am the first to recognise that this may not be enthusiastically received by the elected political class. It is probably a bit much to stomach appointed Peers proposing this idea. However, I am putting this forward on a non-partisan basis in the hope that we can move forward in this area on a basis similar to the one that I am proposing. At the end of the day what I am doing is pinching something. This is not a totally original thought. I am pinching it from Canada’s experience, where in the 1990s the healthcare system in Ontario was literally going broke and they had to find a way of not bypassing the elected political class but facilitating a set of changes that made it easier for elected politicians to take difficult decisions. That is the purpose of this amendment and I move it in that spirit, as a constructive attempt to deal with what I acknowledge is an extremely difficult and complex problem. I beg to move.