Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

I am very grateful to the hon. Lady, and I am happy to do so. We agree that when a woman presents herself at a refuge, there can be an element of discombobulation, to use the hon. Lady's word. However, there comes a time—perhaps in a matter of days, or even longer in the case of particularly vulnerable victims of domestic abuse—when, with the support and help of professionals in the refuge or elsewhere, they are able to make a complaint. They can make a complaint to the police, in the form of either a telephone call or attendance at a police station with support, or they can get help from a solicitor and give them instructions to bring a case for a civil injunction or an ouster order. That has to follow. My point was that it is unfair to expect women to make a complaint immediately, in the hours that follow their departure from home. That is also true in many other contexts. I think the hon. Lady and I would agree that, in the case of rape allegations, the rather worrying aspect in the past was that the victim was often asked, ““Well, why didn't you go to the police immediately?”” We know that that is not a good argument when it comes to serious offences such as rape, which can take days, months or years for people to report. The point I am seeking to make is that there has to be some complaint procedure in the end. Proposed sub-paragraph (10)(k) in amendment 74 uses the term"““other well-founded documentary evidence of abuse””." I know it is difficult to choose a precise phrase that sums up what the amendment's proposers would regard as a sound basis of fact, but that term is open to too much interpretation when it comes to determinations on the granting of legal aid. I think the proposers of the amendment are perhaps on sounder ground in proposed sub-paragraph (10)(h), which mentions"““an undertaking given to a court that the perpetrator of the abuse will not approach the applicant who is the victim of the abuse””." If there is any criticism to be made of that, it is that it is perhaps drafted a little too precisely. Many undertakings given to courts in relation to domestic abuse include not just non-approach but other prohibitions as to particular conduct, contact and other aspects of the mischief that is the subject of the proceedings. It is important that we consider the particulars of the matter, because when parties come to court with a claim relating to domestic abuse, there is quite rightly an impetus for compromise. The parties represented by solicitors or counsel rightly see whether proceedings in the form of evidence given and tested before a judge can be avoided by undertakings being given. ““Undertakings”” is a legal word for promises given by one or other party as to future conduct. In fact, in many cases both parties make promises not to behave in such a way as to cause future strife. That is laudable, and it has been the practice in the civil courts for many years. It saves court time, it saves victims of domestic abuse from having to undergo the trauma of giving evidence, and it looks to the future by trying to draw a line under the sins of the past with regard to the conduct of people who have been in a relationship involving domestic violence. Let us put ourselves in the position of a solicitor or legal adviser who has to advise a party to such proceedings before any decision is made about the giving of undertakings. I see a problem occurring, because if undertakings are not to qualify for the purposes of obtaining future legal aid in domestic violence cases, solicitors will have to advise their clients that that could be the case. In other words, they will have to warn their clients that, if they accept undertakings, that could prejudice any future claim for legal aid. That worries me, for two reasons. First, it could provide a perverse incentive for more litigation, which could result in fewer undertakings being given and a concomitant loss of court time and increase in expenditure. Secondly, it would place legal advisers in a very difficult position when it came to the giving of proper advice. Solicitors or barristers should be there to give advice based on the evidence in the case, rather than on any future contingency that may or may not occur. Could there not be a way through that problem by parties in the case, through their legal representatives, inviting the judge who presides over the proceedings to indicate his or her view of the strength of the evidence? If there were an injunction in which the parties were minded to accept undertakings, the judge might say, ““In this particular case I think there was very strong evidence that could have supported the granting of an injunction.”” The legal representatives could then use that if there were any future domestic abuse leading to a legal aid application. I urge the Government to consider that potential solution to the problem, as I believe it could help not only the parties in a case but those who advise them legally. This debate should not be about whether one party or another is sound on domestic abuse. The truth is that there is a welcome and proper consensus about the seriousness of the incidence of domestic abuse in our society. Politicians, the police and all agencies are determined to stamp it out, intervene prior to violence taking place and deal with the root causes of why one partner in a relationship should choose to abuse the other, whether emotionally, financially, physically or otherwise. This debate is not about whether or not we believe domestic violence is a problem; rather, it is about how the criteria are set. It is therefore a rather narrow debate, and it deserves more mature reflection than some Opposition Members have thus far given it. [Interruption.] I am sorry that Opposition Members do not consider 20 years of experience of actually dealing with domestic violence cases to be important, because I would like to think that those of us who have dealt with victims of domestic violence have a contribution to make, and I bitterly resent any Opposition suggestion—especially in sedentary interventions—that I am deliberately prolonging these proceedings. I am not doing so, and if that accusation is repeated, I shall raise a point of order.