Welfare Reform Bill

My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 51CEC and 51CEE in this group, which probe Clauses 17 and 18. These clauses cover claimants who are subject to all work-related requirements. Clause 17 deals with work search requirements, Clause 18 with work availability requirements. Clause 17 sets down actions which the Secretary of State can require of a claimant, and also limitations that can be placed on those actions. Such limitations can include restrictions to work in particular locations. Our amendment requires the limitations to specifically include, "““consideration of the length and expense of the claimant’s travel””." A similar issue arises in respect of the work availability requirement. As we discussed, the conditionality applies to those out of work and also to those in work. Our briefing note suggests that regulations will make the default position that claimants should look for work that is within one and a half hours’ travel time of their home. This makes a handy headline in the national press to show how tough the Government are on the growing numbers of unemployed. I understand also that it reflects arrangements under the existing JSA regime, after a period. For a start, we contend that the limitations should have regard to cost as well as journey times and that this should be reflected in the regulations and spelled out in claimant commitments. One and a half hours each way is about the time of my journey to Westminster—oh, for the ministerial car—at a cost of more than £100 a week. Individuals on low pay with no long-term job security would not necessarily be in a position to get the cheapest tickets even if the best deals were readily discernible. Of course, the cost of travel from home to work has to be met out of taxed earnings. Journey times will not always be regular, especially in rural areas. They are not inevitably aligned with the hours of a job: five minutes extra at work can mean an hour’s wait for the next bus. It is understood that the Government recognise the need for flexibility in these matters but see the non-application of sanctions as the route to providing it. Is this correct and, thinking about it, is it an appropriate way to proceed? We get an insight into how the Government are dealing with this by looking at the illustrative claimant commitment that has been provided to us. Jack Smith’s job goal is to be secure in work as a plumber, earning at least £8 an hour, full-time, within one and a half hours of his home. It also says that if he does not find this kind of work within eight weeks, his job goal will be reviewed and he may be required to widen it, and presumably widen his travel times as well. There is no recognition that cost could be an issue, but the prospects of widening the job goal are included in this illustrative claimant commitment. Perhaps we may ask what the Government intend on this. It brings us to a wider point. The Government have argued the case for universal credit in terms of simplicity and demonstrably ensuring that people are better off in work. We recognise that it is difficult to have a system that inevitably has some national parameters, so our amendment is an individual underpin that ensures that no one can be made worse off under these provisions by taking up any particular paid work. Clearly, regulations would have to flesh out some definitions of ““worse off””, but the calculation would have to encompass costs as well as income, particularly costs around childcare and caring. I beg to move.