Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill

My Lords, we seem to be moving at quite a speed. My noble friend need not worry too much about her drafting. We have all drafted amendments in the past that we knew were defective in many ways but they are often a useful way of getting the Government to the Dispatch Box to explain what is going on. It is worth going into detail on this issue. I will deal first with the substantive amendment that the noble Baroness has proposed to Clause 6—to which Amendment 45 is consequential. As drafted, the Bill requires the Secretary of State to seek prior court permission to impose a TPIM notice, other than where the urgency procedure set out in Schedule 2 is relied on. This provides an important safeguard in relation to the initial imposition of TPIM notices by the Secretary of State. However, as my noble friend has identified, there is no subsequent requirement for the Secretary of State to seek the court’s prior permission before making any other decision in respect of the TPIM notice. Her amendment would require the Secretary of State to seek prior permission before making three particular decisions. The first is to extend a notice into a second year under Clause 5. The second is to vary the specified measures, on the grounds that this is necessary for preventing or restricting involvement in terrorism-related activity under Clause 12—that is, where the variation is not a reduction in the measures or one made with the consent of the individual. The third is a proposed revival of a TPIM notice under Clause 13. The Bill does not require court permission to take any of these decisions. However, it provides a right of appeal against the exercise of each of these powers. I understand my noble friend’s desire to ensure that the Bill provides sufficient and necessary safeguards in relation to the use of its powers. However, the issue that we need to consider is whether the change she has suggested is necessary or appropriate. It would certainly represent a significant change to what is currently required under the control order regime, in which once court permission has been granted all subsequent decisions of the Secretary of State, including decisions to renew the order, are made by the Secretary of State but with an associated right of appeal. The control order and TPIM regimes are, of course, relatively unusual in requiring court permission before an order is made or a notice is served. It certainly is not a requirement in any other national security context where the Secretary of State has powers to, for example, deport an individual or deprive them of their British citizenship. However we accept that this initial involvement is a proper reflection of the significant nature of the restrictions that can be imposed under either the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 or this Bill. It provides an additional element of court oversight to reflect the significance of the decision to impose a TPIM notice for the first time. However, my noble friend may not be surprised to learn that in almost every control order case permission has been granted to make the order, including in relation to the detail of the obligations. It is, as always, a question of balance. Our view is that the Bill as drafted gets the balance right by requiring initial court permission to impose a TPIM notice other than in exceptional cases—which is the key initial decision made by the Home Secretary—while allowing the Secretary of State to make subsequent decisions but with an associated right of appeal to the court. We do not believe that the additional safeguards that my noble friend suggests are necessary. I therefore hope that she will accept they are not necessary. As I said, it is a question of balance. Such safeguards would not necessarily represent an effective use of the judge’s time. What we propose is about right. I hope, therefore, that my noble friend will withdraw her amendment.