Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill

My Lords, I support the amendments. I can do so relatively briefly because I can quite easily and simply adopt many of the arguments that have been made. Terrorism is the gravest and most dangerous kind of crime and TPIMs are a properly grave response to that threat. A consideration of what the imposition of a TPIM represents gives some clue as to what the correct process should be. The imposition of a TPIM represents a public finding that an individual is involved in acts of terrorism. Of course, the individual’s name is not publicised, but surely his friends and his wider community are aware of it. It is a grave step and a grave potential stigmatising of an individual with an association with the gravest kind of crime. It is in those circumstances that one is driven to the conclusion that, if a TPIM is to be imposed, it should be imposed not by a member of the Executive but rather by a court. It is in those circumstances that I support the amendments to that effect. I have not yet heard an argument why it is better for these measures to be imposed by a member of the Executive. I have heard arguments from my noble and learned friend, whose advocacy I have heard many times in courts up and down the land and which never ceases to impress me, as to why it is not necessarily constitutionally inappropriate but not as to why it is positively better than the alternative. The argument that has been made by a number of my noble friends and other noble Lords is that, given what a TPIM represents and the gravity of the measure, if it can be done by a court it should be done by a court unless there is a very good reason why it should not. I have heard no such reason. The same applies to the burden of proof. I agree entirely with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick: the balance of probabilities is a test which is tailor made, perfectly made, for the process which the court needs to go through in this situation. It is not the criminal standard of proof because these are, in essence, civil penalties, but a civil standard of proof which, as he said, is flexible, realistic, well understood by the judiciary and does justice in civil cases up and down the land, including in other civil preventive measures. Again, I do not understand what the argument against this is. If it is that it should be easier to impose a TPIM—that we cannot trust a judge to come to a safe conclusion about whether something is more likely than not—that is a false argument. It is, if you like, a somewhat cowardly argument. We can trust the judges to apply a balance of probabilities test in TPIMs in a way that is both just and entirely capable of protecting the public.