Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill

My Lords, we come to a very important matter: the appointment of acting police and crime commissioners. Whatever our views on this Bill, one thing is clear: the police and crime commissioners will have considerable power and authority over policing matters in their local police force area. A second point is that, with the numbers so elected, inevitably there may be circumstances in which a police and crime commissioner may become incapacitated: they may be suspended, they may decide to leave office voluntarily, or they may die in office. Quite rightly, the Bill contains provisions for the appointment of an acting commissioner. That is well and good. However, the problem with Clause 63(2) is that an acting commissioner, appointed by the police and crime panel, can only be appointed if they are a member of the police and crime commissioner’s staff at the time of the appointment. The acting commissioner can exercise all the functions of a police and crime commissioner, other than issuing or varying a police and crime plan under Section 6, so the acting police and crime commissioner can dismiss the chief constable. They can set the precept and, as my noble friend Lord Beecham has reminded us, that can be around 9 to 11 per cent, depending on whether you are in England or Wales, of the total council tax bill. I find it quite extraordinary that a staff member—perhaps the chief executive, the director of finance, or the chief of staff—can be appointed to exercise the powers of an elected police and crime commissioner. The reason that this Bill is so constructed is because the Government have decided on this extraordinary concept of a corporate sole. Instead of having sensible governance where it would be clear who might be well placed to be appointed as an acting police and crime commissioner, the Government are flailing around and have come up with this wonderful idea that if the police and crime commissioner in some way cannot carry out their office, a member of their staff should be appointed to do so. That is unacceptable, and I can think of circumstances in which in fact it would be wholly unacceptable. What if the commissioner was suspended because they were charged with an offence which carried a potential imprisonment of more than two years? What if the commissioner were charged with corruption? What if that corruption involved members of their staff? We must remember that there are no corporate governance safeguards over who the police and crime commissioner appoints as a member of their staff: it is wide open for corruption in any case, and corruption will occur. It is inevitable in these arrangements that there will be corruption. We have a situation where an acting police and crime commissioner has to be appointed from among the staff, in the circumstances I have described, of a police and crime commissioner charged with corruption. In those circumstances what possible confidence could the public have in those arrangements and in the acting police and crime commissioner? My amendment seeks to put in place a much more sensible arrangement which allows the police and crime panel to appoint a panel member to serve as the acting police and crime commissioner. That would provide a much greater safeguard in terms of public confidence. We had a good debate on this in Committee. I very much hope that the noble Baroness will be sympathetic to my amendment.