Scotland Bill

I understand the views expressed by my hon. Friend. There are a number of changes and developments in this area, not least the powers in the Bill. I agree with him that this will continue to be a live issue, but at this stage I am not in a position to make any promises to him. However, I am sure that this issue will continue to be debated, and strong views will be expressed. I can understand the points he makes, but this is not the time for a legislative solution. Amendment 23, tabled by the right hon. Member for Birkenhead, is consequential on new clause 8 and would delay the financial provisions in part 3 of the Bill coming into force until two months after the House passes a resolution approving the Chancellor's proposals for a new funding formula. It would then automatically bring part 3 into force two months after such a resolution. I set out why I did not consider it appropriate to debate at this time a new funding formula for Scotland when I discussed new clause 8. The Government are clear that this is a UK-wide administrative procedure and therefore has no place in the Bill. The Government's priority is to stabilise the public finances and reduce the deficit before making any changes to the Barnett formula, as I have said. Even were we able to accept new clause 8, the manner of commencement set out would be problematic because it would create technical problems by potentially bringing in consequential amendments relating to the Scottish variable rate before that itself had been repealed. I am sure that that is not what the right hon. Gentleman intends. The new clause would have other consequences, however. It would mean that clause 32, on borrowing provisions, could not be brought into force until an agreement had been reached on a new funding formula for Scotland. As I have set out, the changes introduced by the Bill are not contingent on a new funding formula being agreed to replace the Barnett formula, so I do not see the need to wait to introduce the borrowing clauses until such a new formula has been agreed. Amendments 25 and 37, and new clauses 9 and 19, relate to corporation tax and alcohol duties. These amendments propose to increase the power in the Bill to provide for an Order in Council specifying corporation tax and alcohol duties as devolved duties. The Scottish Government have publicly requested that six additional powers be included in the Bill, including powers over corporation tax and alcohol duties. I understand that the First Minister has met colleagues in the Government to highlight those requests. In those meetings, the First Minister agreed to provide detailed written analysis of the benefits to both Scotland and the UK of devolving those powers. No such papers have yet been provided. We await them with interest, because we have yet to hear the case made in detail. As hon. Members will recall, the Government are committed to implementing the recommendations of the Calman commission, which considered the merits of devolution for a wide range of taxes and decided that neither corporation tax nor alcohol duties were suitable candidates for devolution. Calman concluded that the potential administrative impact of devolving either tax would be significant. The creation of compliance costs for businesses operating on either side of the border, as well as the increased collection costs for the Government, would be undesirable, especially in the present economic climate. The risks of tax avoidance and arbitrage could also be increased, with additional costs to the Government and the UK Exchequer. These arguments apply to both corporation tax and alcohol duties. Calman also noted that if comparable levels of public services were to be maintained, the scope for substantive reductions in the rate of corporation tax in Scotland would be limited, unless the Scottish Government were willing significantly to increase revenues from other sources, such as income tax. The figures involved could be significant. For instance, if we take the Scottish Government's estimate of the corporation tax base, published in their ““Government Expenditure and Revenue Scotland”” report, and apply the methodologies developed for the Government's paper on rebalancing the Northern Ireland economy, the cost of reducing Scottish corporation tax to 12.5%—the current rate in the Republic of Ireland—would be just over £2 billion. However, the Scottish economy is very different, not least in the presence of many large multinationals, particularly from the financial sector, whose current activity is unlikely to be adequately covered in the gross value added estimate, but whose profits are additionally likely to be attributable to Scotland with regard to corporation tax. Provisional HMRC analysis has indicated that losing payments from large Scottish-domiciled groups could add £600 million to the direct costs. Such tax cuts would have to be funded, either by significantly reduced levels of public spending in Scotland or by tax rises in other areas. It is worth noting that these are initial estimates, and are likely significantly to underestimate the scope for profit shifting to Scotland. The model uses similar assumptions to those applied to the costing for Northern Ireland. However, given the geographic proximity of England and Scotland, the integrated infrastructure, the large number of big GB-owned groups with a substantive presence on both sides of the border, and the relatively large and complex nature of the Scottish economy, there are likely to be greater opportunities for groups to shift profits there than may be the case for Northern Ireland. In addition, corporation tax is a very volatile tax, and would create much more revenue risk for the Scottish budget. For instance, corporate tax receipts fell by 16% from 2008-09 to 2009-10, while income tax receipts fell by 5%. Such a large volatile income stream would place great risk on the Scottish budget. Income tax, which is more predictable and less volatile, is a much more suitable candidate for devolution. The commission based its decision on the strong evidence that it received from the independent expert group and the alcohol retailing and production sector. The evidence identified increased compliance costs and significant scope for tax avoidance, given the mobility of goods such as beer, wine, cider and spirits.