Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill

My Lords, I, too, have amendments in this large group—I am afraid that it is another nine. Like other noble Lords, I apologise to Members of the House who are waiting to speak in the next debate. They are sharing something of the pain that has been experienced during the past few Committee days. My Amendment 148 deals with the suspension of a PCC who is charged with an offence. The Bill provides that the suspension will kick in if the charge is of an offence which carries a term of two years’ or more imprisonment. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, has pitched that at six months; I have brought it right down to any imprisonable offence. The commissioner will be a man—almost certainly—to whom the chief constable, and hence the force, is accountable. It is important that the credibility of the person right at the top is not under threat. I recognise that this is harsh, because we are talking about a charge and not a conviction. There may be a balance to be struck by looking at the type of offence and at whether the salary should continue to be payable. In most situations where somebody is suspended, salary, allowances and so on continue to be paid. The penalty in this case is that the salary is not paid for the period of suspension, which could do with some examination. Amendment 148AA would provide for the suspension of the commissioner who "““is the subject of an allegation of a serious complaint or … conduct matter””—" I have picked up definitions from elsewhere in the Bill—extending beyond a criminal offence to ““other corrupt behaviour””. Other noble Lords have talked of their experiences of dealing with corruption and have seen the fallout at close quarters. I am not sure that ““corrupt behaviour”” is the right expression, but I am sure that conduct matters are too central to the model—any model—to be left to regulations. We need provisions in the Bill. Nor is it proper to put matters which may affect the whole attitude of the force and individual careers into secondary legislation. Notwithstanding that, my Amendment 149B would give a regulation-making power to the Secretary of State on the setting of standards to be observed by the commissioner. It would do so not because I think that that is necessarily the right way to go about it but because I want to draw attention to and probe how the Government intend to deal with the setting of standards. Amendment 149D would add to Schedule 7 a new paragraph providing for the panel to monitor and review complaints and conduct matters and their handling. It would give the panel a wider role in order for it to be able to consider not just individual problems but the overall picture. I stress ““monitor””, ““review”” and ““handling””. Amendment 172 takes us to the veto of the appointment of a chief constable, which should be a meaningful power. I shall not repeat the arguments advanced for three-quarters, two-thirds or 50 per cent plus one, but noble Lords know where I have been going on this issue. Amendments 173, 174 and 175 would remove certain powers of the Secretary of State. Schedule 8 provides that the Secretary of State may make regulations about next steps if there is a veto of the appointment, including, as I read it, allowing them to insist on the appointment of a candidate who has been rejected. Secondly, the schedule provides for regulations on limits on who may be considered for appointment, including limits not only on but to—in other words including—a previously unsuccessful candidate; and then confers functions on the Secretary of State or ““any other person””. That raises a lot of questions. Finally, Amendment 216A is an add on to the disqualification from election for or being in office as a commissioner—that is, being the subject of an investigation by or on behalf of the IPCC resulting in a recommendation for qualification. The group covers an enormous amount of ground because there is an enormous amount of ground still to be covered.