Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill

My Lords, I apologise to those Members of the House who are keen to move on to the other debate, but I have to say that it is quite strange that we moved on at this point to this group of amendments, given their sheer number, complexity and importance. I am afraid that I have four issues to raise and, although I will abbreviate what I would otherwise have said, I think that they are important. The first is that there must be a clear and robust framework for the conduct of people who are either elected police and crime commissioners or, in the case of London, the mayor or the deputy mayor responsible for policing and crime. The same applies to whatever other structure we may have, whether it be police and crime commissions or anything else. The reason why we must have a robust and clear set of guidelines for conduct is that potentially very serious problems could arise. Although provision is made in the Bill to deal with the most extreme examples, it does not cover the sort of things that are much more likely to happen. If an elected police and crime commissioner, having been briefed by a chief officer of police about a particular investigation, takes it upon himself or herself to telephone the subject of the investigation and talk to them about it, how will that be dealt with? Where are the guidelines and rules of conduct to say that that is not appropriate behaviour for such a person? I find it extraordinary that there is no mechanism for dealing with such an event. I also find it extraordinary that there are no mechanisms for dealing with what are perhaps slightly less serious matters, or indeed for providing a framework so that the people who are elected understand what is and is not permissible. Things of this sort could happen, so there is a need for a robust and proper framework to deal with them. I am extremely grateful to my noble friend Lady Henig for tabling this group of amendments and for giving us an opportunity, albeit it at a rather inappropriate moment, to debate these points. There has to be a framework for conduct, whether it is the standard structure as set out in these amendments or something else. However, there must be an explicit code of conduct. My second point relates to the appointment of senior officers. I know that the purpose of the Bill is to have a pure line of accountability with the elected individual holding the chief constable or chief officer of police to account and with the chief officer of police then having absolute control over the force. Again, however, I wonder how well this is going to work in practice. There have been too many instances, even under the existing arrangements, under which the appointment of senior officers is led by police authority members, where it has been felt that in particular police forces there is a golden group of individuals who are selected, supported, encouraged and promoted by the chief constable—they always get preferment. The consequence of having the kind of appointments process set out in the Bill, which the amendments would unpick, is that that is all the more likely. Even if such preferment does not exist, the perception of it will be there. We will have chief constables constantly being assailed by rumours and stories saying that they promote only people in their own image or those whom they particularly favour. If people think that this would not happen, I can assure them that it would. The same applies to the third group of issues to which I want to refer, which concern discipline. These are the sorts of things that are always difficult and contentious, so in the circumstances it is going to be extremely hard for the chief officer of police to be responsible for disciplinary matters in respect of close colleagues. If one of those colleagues is not disciplined over a matter, the assumption will be made that it is because of favouritism on the part of the chief officer. That may or may not be the case, but the assumption will be made. That is why the broader mechanism set out in these amendments is needed. I want to refer briefly to my final point, which concerns the grounds on which a chief constable can be removed. I understand that the Government want to see a situation where, if the elected individual or the commissioners decide that a chief constable is not meeting their requirements, it is possible to dispense with him and appoint someone else. However, the grounds for doing so are not given in the Bill. There is no information on how or when this is to happen or what the circumstances will be. I have put my name to a number of amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, which at least try to state something about the grounds—that is, that the action taken should be in the interests of the efficiency and effectiveness of the force. That is the bare minimum that one can expect. Without those statements and without some framework, what will happen and how will these matters be taken forward? I hope that the Minister will recognise that these are important principles and that, without a framework against which it can be seen that an elected individual is acting responsibly in dismissing or suspending a chief officer of police, there will be endless problems.