Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill

In moving this amendment, I shall speak also to Amendments 101B and 101C, Amendments 234ZZA to 234ZZE and Amendments 234R and 234S. I find myself at a bit of a disadvantage in that some of the amendments in this group are consequential, arising out of another group of amendments dealing with chief officer appointments, suspensions, professional standards and dismissals. The explanation of their effect will therefore be disconnected from the main body of the debate but I will outline their effect briefly and perhaps refer back to them when we come to the appropriate group. Amendments 101A to 101C revise the proposals in the Bill in relation to the delegation of functions by police and crime commissioners. They would enable a police and crime commissioner to delegate functions to a police officer and to another local policing body—I will explain shortly why I think that this is necessary. They would also enable the appointment, suspension and removal of chief officers to be delegated to police and crime panels in certain circumstances, which are set out in a separate group of amendments that we shall come to later. Amendments 234ZZA to 234ZZE deal with redefining the meaning of local policing bodies and elected local policing bodies in the interpretation part of the Bill. They would include police commissions in this definition rather than police and crime commissioners, as currently drafted. That would, of course, affect the use of these phrases throughout the Bill. Amendments 234R and 234S affect Schedule 16 by reamending the changes set out in the schedule to the Police Reform Act 2002 dealing with chief officer appointments and like matters. As I mentioned, these are the subject of a separate group of amendments that I shall bring forward. The Bill as drafted removes the definition of ““senior officer”” and replaces it with ““chief officer”” in relation to the roles of local policing bodies in appointments and removals. My amendments would effectively revert back to the current position whereby the local policing body appoints all ACPO-rank officers, not just the chief officer. I believe that my amendments in relation to the delegation of functions by the police and crime commissioner are important. Noble Lords will recall that, on the last day in Committee, I argued that chief officers should not be corporations sole. I am not going to go over those arguments again but, if they are not to be separate corporations, some other mechanism is needed by which they can be given responsibility for the day-to-day management of police finances and other matters by the governing body. This would make it essential to be able to delegate functions to chief officers. At the moment, the police and crime commissioner cannot do this because the Bill specifically prohibits functions from being delegated to a constable. A chief officer may be a very grand constable, but he is none the less a constable and, as the Bill stands, cannot have police and crime commissioner functions delegated to him or her. As a matter of general principle, this prohibition lacks flexibility, as there may be other functions that the police and crime commissioner might want to delegate that can be more effectively carried out by the force than by the local policing body. As a specific matter in relation to the delegation of budgetary management, such delegation would be essential if the chief officer is not to be a corporation sole. I am, if you like, outlining alternative means. My next amendment would remove the prohibition on delegating functions to another local policing body. This is intended to be used within the context of collaboration where it is currently not possible to formulate a lead authority model of collaboration—that is, where one authority deals with a particular collaboration agreement or a particular aspect of collaboration on behalf of other authorities. The Bill would continue this prohibition into the new model of police governance. That means not only that every collaboration agreement has to be signed by every party to it, but also that every one has to be managed by every party to it. This will greatly increase bureaucracy, so it would streamline the processes if one governing body was able to manage an agreement on behalf of the others. My amendment would enable this to happen. That seems a matter of common sense and good management practice, as well as a way of reducing the burden of administration in difficult financial times. I suspect that the Minister sympathises with the desire to reduce bureaucracy but will tell me that this would be tantamount to abrogating responsibility for collaborative matters. He may also say that it could be used to abrogate responsibility for other types of functions, which could be disastrous. I do not think so. As I think I have mentioned, a delegation agreement is a tightly drawn document which is very specific about what functions can be delegated, in what circumstances and to what extent. It is not a casual carte blanche. However, if the Committee thinks that there are loopholes, I would be happy to consider putting conditions around this to ensure that it could be used only in the context of collaboration agreements, which is the intention of the amendment. The third amendment in this group is effectively a consequential amendment to those on chief officer appointments, which fall in a different group to be debated later. It would bring consistency to an amendment that I am going to propose in that group, which is that in certain circumstances, where the police and crime commissioner has a conflict of interest in appointing, disciplining, suspending or dismissing the chief officer, the police and crime panel or police commission may undertake this function. My next five amendments relate to earlier changes voted on by this House to create police commissions. They would change the definition in the interpretation part of the Bill so that the phrases ““local policing body”” and ““elected local policing body”” became synonyms for police commissions rather than police and crime commissioners. This would have a significant effect on the entire Bill and I hope that it more accurately reflects the intentions of this House in relation to the role of police commissions. The commissions having been created, the amendment would give them a significant role in police governance and funding throughout the Bill. Police commissions comprise both the police and crime panels and the police and crime commissioner, so giving effect to the more collaborative approach to police governance that I believe the original amendment intended. I know that time is short today and I shall not elaborate every area of the Bill that the amendment would affect, but I note in passing that, in my view, it would not affect the arrangements set out in the Bill in relation to London. As previously noted, the final amendments in my name are effectively consequential on the group of amendments dealing with senior officer appointments. They would ensure that the local policing body retained police authorities’ current responsibility for appointing, disciplining, suspending and dismissing all police officers of ACPO rank—that is, assistant and deputy chief constables as well as chief constables. The Bill proposes that chief constables take this role in relation to deputy chief constables and assistant chief constables. I shall not take the time now to set out my arguments about why I believe that this is a mistake, but I shall certainly do so under a later appropriate group of amendments. Meanwhile, I beg to move.