Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill

I shall speak to other amendments in the group and refer to their numbering as I come to them. In the last debate, my noble friend Lord Shipley referred to the tools that police and crime panels need; I would add to that ammunition. From time to time ammunition is needed—although preferably not used—and the knowledge that it is there can sometimes work wonders. My noble friend did not use the term ““outward looking””, although it was implicit in what he said. Panels need to relate—I appreciate that I am in part reflecting the previous debate as an introduction to the points that I am about to make—not only to the police and crime commissioner but to everyone else, including the communities involved in, in the jargon, the policing landscape, although one might just say life. Amendments 91 and 92 deal with obtaining views in connection with the precept. Under the Bill as drafted, the police and crime panels have to obtain residents’ and business’s views; my amendments provide that they should also obtain the views of local authorities and, in London, the London boroughs. Again, this is blindingly obvious. The local authorities are there at the most local level—by definition they are the most grass root—and they send out the bills that incorporate the precept. If the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, is agreed, they will send out separate bills with the precept. So my first point is about more extensive consultation. Amendments 117, 118, 119, 120 and 121 relate to Schedule 5 and concern what I might summarise as the realities of approving or blocking the precept. In our view, if the police and crime panel is to provide the right checks and balances, it needs to be able to do more. I have always thought of the precept as the last point in a discussion about local authority and equivalent budgets. One has to think about what needs to be spent, how it should be spent and what is available to be spent before one comes to the precept. In order to go through those thought processes and apply their logic, the panel needs to be able to bring other issues into the public arena for debate and have tools to deal with more than just the precept—in other words, to deal with the whole budget and the steps on the way to creating it. The budget is essentially the spending to be undertaken using the local funding—the precept—and the central grant. Of course, in the policing world, the central funding is enormously important. It would be a great pity if the panel were taken down the road of thinking that what mattered was what people were charged instead of also looking at the totality of the budget. I know that that attitude is very widespread, but I would always do anything that I could to stop it being perpetuated. My amendments propose that the panel should have a role in looking at the heads of expenditure within the budget. That may not be the right way of expressing it, but noble Lords will understand what I mean if I refer to ““press and PR”” as one budget head, and perhaps the ““commissioner’s office””. Then there is the ““back office””, if one can ever define what the back office is, and things such as sickness rates. My amendments intend to give the panel the opportunity to make a reality check on what is proposed and to block virement between budget heads. Unless the panel can prevent moving around between the different parts of the budget after the totality has been agreed, it is not really able to fulfil the function that it should. Amendments 146 and 147 would change the majority needed to block or veto the budget from three-quarters to two-thirds, although as this debate has gone on I have become more and more persuaded of the need for that veto to be exercisable on the basis of 50 per cent plus one—not 50 per cent, which is different, but 50 per cent plus one. I have provided for an iterative process for the panel to give its approval or not, built on the procedure and drafting with which I am familiar from the Greater London Authority but also from other authorities that have directly elected mayors. I do not like the word ““iterative””, but noble Lords will understand it. I think that the two-thirds level is counterintuitive, which is a term that has been very much used—and other noble Lords will have heard this—by our then colleague Bob Neill, who is now a Minister. In criticising the way in which the GLA budget had to be dealt with because of the legislation, he talked often very powerfully about how constituents had spoken to him on the subject of his having a direct electoral mandate but not being able, as a Member of the Assembly, to block the mayor’s budget. Other noble Lords, as Members of the GLA, will have heard about the budget being in a common-sense way defeated when it came to us from the mayor but having to be approved technically because there was not the sufficient majority against it. I am sympathetic to Amendment 116ZA in this group, which refers to a link between the money and the objectives. In my mind, that is what I am trying to say when I talk about budget heads. Finally, I refer to the 13th report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. Paragraph 7 is on the regulations regarding precepts in Schedule 5, which the committee says, "““go to the substance of precepts that may be issued in cases where commissioners’ proposals have been vetoed by panels—and, as well as enabling constraints to be imposed on such precepts, the regulations may confer wide discretion on persons not even identified in the Bill””." The memorandum provided to the committee by the Home Office, "““gives no explanation about the purpose of those powers, how they might be exercised or who (if anyone) might be consulted before … regulations are made. The issue and withholding of precepts are potentially important matters which may affect the operational capability of the police or their perceived independence””—" I stress the words ““operational capability”” and ““perceived independence””. The committee drew this power to the House’s attention to, "““seek further information from the Minister in order to determine whether the negative procedure provides an appropriate level of scrutiny””." That is what I am asking for with my final amendment. I beg to move.