Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill (Programme) (No. 2)

Yes, I am aware of that issue. The predecessor council to mine in Medway, Rochester upon Medway council, similarly had no council tax and when Medway took over as a unitary authority, we had one of the lowest council taxes in the country—virtually the lowest except for the Scilly Isles at one point. However, we had the same percentage limit as everyone else, so when central Government put a new burden on local government and we had to fund it as a fixed cost, we were less well-placed to do that because the amount we could get through a percentage increase was less than other councils that had previously had higher taxes could get. A similar regime to that for local councils has applied to police authorities, but to an extent it has been less controversial than that for councils because police authorities have not had the same democratic mandate as local government. There are only nine elected councillors on my police authority among 17. It is true that the majority of those nine must approve the precept as well as a majority of the 17, but it is certainly less of a democratic mandate than that for local councils in which all the local councillors are elected. I have understood, previously, that when the Communities Secretary, rather than the Home Secretary, has capped an authority, that has not been popular with the authority, but I have understood why it happened. However, I can see the attraction of moving from that to a referendum power as we are doing with local government. I think there is a potential problem or issue, which I hope can be resolved through the Bill or its application, with bringing in the new body—the local police and crime panel. The panel will have a representative from every council in the police area, and I particularly welcome the involvement of district councils, which have been so important in developing crime and disorder reduction partnerships and community safety partnerships. Their involvement on the ground will be a real advantage: it will bring real insight to the commissioner and the force and it will pull local government more generally into the new arrangements. We hear a lot about the Local Government Association or police authorities not liking the new arrangements, and people who have a particular stake in the existing process might say that, but the districts coming in is going to be a real gain. There is dispute about how strong the panel will be, and its powers are characterised in various ways, but one of its key powers will be its oversight and scrutiny of the budget. It is proposed that, in extremis, if three quarters of the panel agree, the panel can exercise what is described as a veto in the Bill, and paragraphs 7 and 8 of schedule 5 prescribe that the Secretary of State can make further regulations on that. In Committee, the Minister described some of his intentions for the regulations, but I am a little unclear about that because the regulations referred to in the Bill seem to be about how that veto process will work, whereas quite a lot of the detail that the Minister gave to the Committee seemed to refer to when or where there would be a referendum and the Secretary of State's involvement. That is one of the issues, because it is envisaged in the Localism Bill that the Secretary of State will have referendum-calling powers and will presumably use regulations to determine how that happens. It is envisaged in the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill that the panel will have a veto and that there will be regulations on that. The crossover is not clear. There will be a directly elected individual who will come to office with a great mandate. One of his responsibilities is to set the budget and the precept, yet there are two other bodies—the panel and the Secretary of State; it is not clear whether it is the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government or the Home Secretary—who have at least some locus standi in setting the budget. We have to trust the commissioner generally to get on with it. There should be a reserve power, so that in extremis if there is a serious problem with the commissioner or if he does something that is completely out of line, the body with that power can come in and mitigate the problem. However, I am not convinced that we need two bodies, with the panel supposedly exercising a veto and the Secretary of State possibly requiring a referendum. It is not quite clear how those two things work together. The new clause would try to achieve greater clarity with a focus on the local and democratic. The Bill refers to giving the panel a veto, but when I read what the Minister said about what the regulations would do, it was not clear that it was a veto. If what is described as a veto is exercised, the elected commissioner has to ““have regard to”” that. We heard in the preceding debate how difficult that phrase can be. Having had regard to the veto, the commissioner can propose another figure—presumably, it would be at least marginally different—and can set it as the precept for the coming year. Does the phrase ““have regard to”” mean that the commissioner has to do what the panel wants or, at the other extreme, is it envisaged that he can just come back with something marginally different, and that is his decision as the commissioner? Are we saying that we cannot really make up our mind and that the courts have to decide all this and there will be litigation? That does not strike me as ideal, so I hope that, perhaps in the other place, we will reach agreement on this issue.