Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

My Lords, it is obvious that we have had an important debate following a number of other debates on amendments where we have looked at the structure of Clause 2. In this case, the intention of the amendment is to seek more certainty about what will constitute a no-confidence vote. It is clear from the amendment—indeed it was said by the mover, my noble friend Lord Cormack, and the noble Lord, Lord Armstrong of Ilminster—that an early election would inevitably follow specific types of no-confidence votes being carried in the House of Commons. It is interesting that the concern of all contributors has been about how we ensure that we are certain about what a no-confidence motion is. My noble friend Lord Maclennan of Rogart made the important point that even the amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Cormack does not necessarily exclude other possible amendments. That indicates the difficulties. I have tried to be open about the objective, which is to try to devise a means by which there can be a trigger mechanism for an early election but with a degree of certainty and without opening the door for abuse. If I can helpfully work on that basis, I respect the views of those who say that they are totally against fixed-term Parliaments, but this Bill is designed to bring in a fixed-term Parliament; a number of noble Lords set out specific arguments based on our having a fixed-term Parliament. I think there is some agreement that if we have fixed-term Parliaments, there must be a mechanism to trigger an early election. I have not detected any desire in your Lordships' House for a very fixed, rigid system. The noble Lord, Lord Cormack, in introducing his amendment rightly indicated that if we are to have what he described as the escape clause, it must be clear, simple, understandable and not capable of misrepresentation. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, asked what was the thinking behind the Government’s position as we set it out. Why had we not specified words? My noble friend Lord Norton encouraged us to have a statutory definition of a no confidence motion. The reason why—