UK Parliament / Open data

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

My Lords, I am delighted to be able to move this amendment. I have listened with great care to all the debates today on Clause 2 and, as I have listened, I have become more and more convinced of two things: first, that there are tremendous advantages in having an unwritten, flexible constitution; secondly, that Clause 2 is, frankly, incapable of proper improvement and should be deleted and replaced by something else. It is in that spirit that I have tabled this amendment, ably supported by—and I am most grateful to them—the noble Lords, Lord Armstrong and Lord Norton of Louth, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Howe of Aberavon, all three of them constitutional experts of great eminence. We all feel very strongly not that this amendment is necessarily perfect in every particular but that it offers a better and clearer approach to a problem that the Government themselves acknowledge needs to be addressed. The Government feel there must be an escape clause in the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill. If we are to have a Fixed-term Parliaments Bill—and again I have become more and more convinced that we really do not need one—then the escape clause must be clear, simple, understandable, not capable of misinterpretation and, in the light of that very interesting debate that we had shortly before the dinner break, not something that places the Speaker of the day in an intolerable position. I am attempting in this amendment to clarify and simplify, and to remove the Speaker from that invidious position about which the noble Baroness, Lady Boothroyd, and the noble Lord, Lord Martin of Springburn, spoke so eloquently. I am trying with this amendment to define a vote of no confidence. The noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, has already referred in the earlier debate that we had just a few moments ago to the fact that in the Parliament Act there is a clear definition of a money Bill. He asked very sensibly why, if the Government are picking, they do not have, as a precedent, both the Deputy Speaker provision and the definition. Why did they choose the one and not the other? My noble friend the Minister has already in a number of remarks today given me some quiet encouragement, and I hope that that will be confirmed when he replies to this debate because he has indicated that there is merit in having a definition of a no-confidence Motion. I have sought here to list the occasions on which there clearly would be an issue in the House of Commons where the Government of the day had forfeited the confidence of the other place. The first is if the House of Commons, "““passes an amendment to the motion thanking Her Majesty for the Gracious Speech which would have the effect of negating it””." I believe that that particular provisional clause could be slightly improved in the light of what we have said earlier today. Maybe we should say, ““In the second or later Session of a Parliament””, because I accept that if a Government have not had any programme and their Queen’s Speech is rejected within weeks of the election, that is slightly different, as it was in 1924. However, if the Government have been in power, have governed for a Session on the Queen’s Speech, and lose the confidence at any time, there can surely be no doubt that that is an absolute rejection of them. Secondly, if the House of Commons, "““denies a second or third reading to a Finance Bill””" no Government can continue. My noble friend Lord Forsyth referred earlier today to the prime function of the other place to grant supply. If they are not in a position to do that, the Government of the day cannot continue to provide the government. It is therefore self-evident that if a Finance Bill is rejected on Second or Third Reading, there really can be no future for that Government. I have also put into proposed new subsection (2)(b) in the amendment, "““any Bill defined by the Prime Minister of the day as being essential to his or her administration continuing in office””." At Second Reading a number of noble Lords referred to Mr Edward Heath saying at the time of the Bill that took this country into what was then the Common Market that if that Bill was rejected at Second Reading his Government could not continue. Every Government have a flagship Bill, and if they lose on it they really cannot continue in office. Again, that is generally self-evident. Then, if the House of Commons passes, "““a motion of no confidence tabled by the Leader of Her Majesty’s Opposition””," and if that sort of Motion is carried, it is clear that Members on the Government side, or Members who normally support the Government, have withdrawn their support. Many of us in the debates on the Bill have referred to March 1979, the defeat of the then Labour Government led by James Callaghan, and his exceptionally dignified conduct in defeat. His words have been quoted yet again today. He said that his Government had lost the confidence of the House and must now take their case to the country. It was clear cut, it was simple and everyone understood it. The case is similar if the House of Commons, "““defeats a motion of confidence tabled by the Prime Minister””." Many of us will remember that John Major tabled a Motion of confidence in his Government. However, it was carried, so the Government carried on. Had it been defeated, they could not have carried on. If we seek to have a definition of a vote of no confidence along these lines, we are improving this Bill very considerably. How undignified is all this business of having 14 days in which to scrabble around to try to save a Government who have clearly become discredited in the eyes of Members of the House of Commons. Then there is the business of the two-thirds majority of the Members of the House of Commons, not of those who vote. In a House of 600, as it probably will be by the next general election, 400 have to vote. At Second Reading, in a very amusing and wry speech, the noble Lord, Lord McAvoy, said in effect that the Whips have means of making you vote. Of course, he knows that better than most people; he practised the dark arts with a consummate artistry that has rarely been rivalled. If in March 1979, after the Government had lost by one vote, there had been a period following that, I doubt very much whether a few would not have changed their minds, either when being offered inducements or maybe even by being not so gently threatened. The noble Lord is laughing in assent; he knows that that is the case. We all know that these things can happen. Those of us who were there on March 1979, on the very rare occasion of a Government being defeated a vote of no confidence, all know what happened. I referred to it in my maiden speech. We had the wonderful spectacle of Frank Maguire coming to abstain in person. We know that the Welsh and the Scottish nationalists, disgruntled with the Government following the devolution votes, were not going to support them. I am delighted to see my noble friend—and I call him that deliberately—Lord Wigley on the Benches over there, because he remembers that as well as I.
Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
726 c1181-3 
Session
2010-12
Chamber / Committee
House of Lords chamber
Back to top