Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

I am happy to do so. I think that I corrected myself the first time I got it wrong. I am grateful to my noble friend for reminding me of that. As I say, since the Second World War no Government have been able to command two-thirds of all the seats. This means that Parliament can choose to dissolve itself but Government cannot dissolve Parliament for their own political advantage. The noble Lord, Lord Howarth, asked why the two-thirds requirement should not be set out in Standing Orders rather than in statute. The two-thirds requirement is set out in legislation as opposed to Standing Orders so that any change to the requirement would have to be made by fresh primary legislation, which would require the consent of both Houses of Parliament, whereas Standing Orders of the other place would require only one House of Parliament to determine that and probably could be amended or revoked by a single simple majority in the other place, and therefore could defeat the purpose of the measure. It is better to have the two-thirds vote set out in statute, which means that it has to be changed by statute. That would involve this House rather than the other place simply determining it by means of its own Standing Orders. It is not appropriate that a significant detail of reform affecting Parliament as a whole with implications for our prerogative should be amended by Standing Orders of one House of Parliament. The noble Lord, Lord Howarth, very helpfully indicated that he would speak to his Amendments 28 and 29 at the same time. The first of those would omit the requirement for a two-thirds majority while the second would increase the figure to three-quarters of all MPs voting in favour of the measure instead of two-thirds. The reason why we are opposed to the simple majority—it would be a majority in that case—for the Dissolution is because it would undermine one of the purposes of the Bill: namely, establishing a fixed term and removing the Executive’s ability to decide when Parliament should be dissolved. Noble Lords may recall that at Second Reading mention was made of the late Lord Holme of Cheltenham and his analysis of arrangements whereby the Prime Minister can choose the timing of the election. Lord Holme described a general election as, "““a race in which the Prime Minister is allowed to approach it with his running shoes in one hand and his starting pistol in the other””.—[Official Report, 1/3/11; col. 1007.]" I have reflected why he would not have his running shoes on, but he would certainly have the starting pistol in his hands. Unfortunately, Amendment 28 of the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, would preserve the Executive’s ability to decide when a Parliament was dissolved, by providing that a Dissolution motion could be passed by a simple majority. At the other end of the scale, the noble Lord suggests a majority of 75 per cent of Members who vote. Again, it is not an unreasonable proposition, but I believe that, on balance, the threshold of two-thirds strikes the right balance in providing a safeguard against abuse of the power, while ensuring the effectiveness of the Bill’s provisions. This Parliament passed similar provisions in relation to the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly and the Northern Ireland Assembly. I have sought to explain why there are two mechanisms and how they are different. I indicated clearly that the 55 per cent originally proposed did not find favour. Therefore, it was only right and proper that the Government listened to those views, and we have come forward with two trigger mechanisms—one for when there should be an election, if there is a consensus, and another for when the Government have lost the confidence of the House of Commons. They are different issues that are dealt with separately. Interestingly, the Constitution Committee, whatever other concerns it may have had, thought that the Government’s proposals on the two trigger mechanisms were an appropriate way forward. In those circumstances, I ask my noble friend to withdraw the amendment.