Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

My Lords, I also put my name to the amendment to remove the two-thirds provision. This was an improvisation when the coalition’s original proposal—that 55 per cent of Members of Parliament should be able to require an early general election—was greeted with widespread derision and, indeed, anger. It was noted, even before Mr Laws underlined it in his book, that the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats together had 56 per cent of the votes in the House of Commons. The Liberal Democrats and Labour had less than 55 per cent, and so this deal would have guaranteed that Parliament could only be dissolved at the wish of both partners in the Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition. They could not get away with that, so they built in the two-thirds requirement. They certainly did so with a continuing view of protecting their hold on office. This two-thirds figure has not been adequately considered. It is argued in its support that no post-war Government have commanded two-thirds of the votes of the House of Commons, but it has also been noted that the National Government of 1931 did command two-thirds of the votes of the House of Commons. We cannot rule out the possibility that there could be another landslide general election. It is admittedly unlikely that one party could secure quite such a large proportion of seats in the House of Commons, but it is not inconceivable. What is more reasonable to anticipate is that a new coalition could be formed. Perhaps this coalition could seduce other minority parties to join it. It would need only another 10 per cent of Members of Parliament to get to the magic figure required. This is a constitutional innovation of major significance that is quite unheralded, unconsulted upon and undebated by academics and the public. It is true that under its own standing orders the House of Commons does in certain situations stipulate that certain numbers of Members of Parliament must vote, for example, for a quorum or a closure. So it is not entirely novel as a principle of Commons procedure, but it is certainly novel constitutionally. If a super-majority is felt to be preferable, why does it have to be provided for in legislation? Could it not be provided for in the Standing Orders of the House of Commons? Indeed, why should we not accept—this is after all the status quo—that a simple majority for an early general election would be sufficient in the House of Commons? If it is convenient to the House, I shall speak to Amendments 28 and 29 in the course of the same remarks, although if noble Lords wish those amendments to be debated in the separate group as is set down on the list, I shall defer to the wishes of the House. However, the subject is sufficiently germane. Amendment 28 would allow a general election to occur on 51 per cent of the vote in the House of Commons—a majority of one. That is the status quo, although I am not aware that events have ever worked out like that. Of course, we would have to fear that a provision of that kind would be open to abuse by the coalition. However, I was always happy to trust the Prime Minister’s word. When he declared last May that he would not seek a solution before May 2015, I had no reason whatever to doubt his sincerity or integrity. That seemed quite sufficient; it was not actually necessary to legislate. We did not even need a binding resolution, let alone the contrivance of a requirement of a two-thirds majority. Amendment 29 introduces another variant to assist noble Lords, I hope, to think through the implications of the Bill. It replaces the two-thirds requirement for an early Dissolution with a 75 per cent requirement. If there is to be a super-majority, should it not be big enough to ensure that even after a landslide victory the governing party could not in due course when it suited it seek an early election and obviate the purpose of this fixed-term Parliaments legislation to remove the power of the Prime Minister to determine the date of the election in his own and his party’s interests? It is not entirely unimaginable that there could be a landslide election that would produce a majority in excess of two-thirds. Noble Lords will recall that in October 1993, Kim Campbell, the Prime Minister of Canada and leader of the Progressive Conservative Party, called an election. Her party suffered the most extraordinary defeat; previously, it had held 169 seats and after the election it held only two seats. She resigned and Jean Chrétien of the Liberals became Prime Minister and was then in office for 10 years. You never know what will happen and it is entirely possible that, if the coalition Government govern wisely and well and if we have a statesmanlike Budget on Wednesday and the land flows with milk and honey and there is a sustained boom and crime disappears from our country and the lion lies down with the lamb, after some years of this benign state of affairs the people of this country would be so reconciled to coalition government that they would enthusiastically vote in huge numbers for its recreation following the next election and that they would win a landslide victory. I do not think that it is going to happen, but we cannot rule out any even implausible contingency. However, dream as noble Lords opposite might, it is very unlikely that they would get beyond 75 per cent, as happened in Canada. So I think that that would be a safe limit to set. More realistically, there might be another coalition in the future that is composed of bigger parties or of more parties so that its votes in the House of Commons would surpass the two-thirds. So I think that 75 per cent might be safer, and, of course, if the general mood of the House of Commons was that it was time for a general election, then a 75 per cent vote would indeed be obtainable.