Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

I accept that; it gives rise to the concern that has been expressed and that I am, for these purposes, accepting. If it be the case that enactment of legislation starts in year two of a Parliament, and given the point made by the noble Lords, Lord Martin and Lord Grocott, which I think we all accept, that the last year of a Parliament is given over to preparing for a general election, a five-year Parliament leaves a period of three years for positive legislation and a four-year Parliament leaves only two years, because we all accept that inevitably the imminence of Dissolution makes legislation more difficult, as the time is limited in the last year. I suggest to the House that the stability that is required for the convenient and sensible passage of legislation is better achieved with three whole years between the first and last years. In terms of government rather than simply legislation, I also suggest that four years runs a danger of leading to short-term planning, which inhibits a strategic approach to all forms of activity in government. That point was well made by the noble Lord, Lord Armstrong of Ilminster, at Second Reading. On the other side, of course it is the case that regular recourse to the electorate is at the heart of our democratic system of government. However, there is no doubt that Governments that are too driven by early electoral considerations may not be the best or most effective Governments. The four-year term in the United States is frequently and rightly criticised for its shortened electoral cycle and for the fact that from far too early in the term the Administration are looking for the prospects of re-election—all political eyes are firmly fixed on the next election. The last point is this: a shorter term has the effect of depriving the electorate of the time to judge on mature reflection the effectiveness of government policy and legislation. That is particularly true of a reforming Government who reform the way in which the public services are delivered and taxes and benefits are administered, as this Government will and as may be the case with many future Governments. That is the case because the preparations for the Dissolution and an election come at a time when much of what the Government have done during the term, particularly after the first year of the term—this brings me back to the point about pre-legislative scrutiny—has not had time to take effect, so the electorate have not had the opportunity to judge what the Parliament and the Government have done during the term. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, laughed when I talked about a matter of principle with reference to what I had previously described, and continue to describe, as a matter of judgment. Of course that is right, but I suggest that the better balance between four years and five years is the one that the Government have struck and incorporated in this Bill as unamended.