Scotland Bill

The borrowing powers in the Bill are at the heart of devolution. On Second Reading, a number of serious questions were raised on both revenue and capital borrowing powers. I shall come to the detailed issues in the main part of my comments, but, fundamentally, I am seeking to put in place a code of practice for the Treasury and the Scottish Government to address limits, restrictions, thresholds, maximum amounts and the nature of borrowing, be it through bonds or direct loans from the consolidated fund. That is a sensible way to amend the Bill. To make such provisions otherwise would require draft orders to be tabled, but amendments to Bills cannot be made with draft orders. Much of the narrative on this matter is in the Command Paper, but it is likewise impossible to amend by amending the Bill. The amendments are pretty self-explanatory but I would like to detail the reasons for them. The revenue-borrowing powers are fundamentally linked to the wider taxation proposals in the Bill. Both the Scottish National party and the Scottish Government have previously made clear their concerns about the tax proposals. If a full range of fiscal policy levers were available to the Scottish Government, it would have to include a borrowing regime with sufficient flexibility to allow public spending profiles to be managed across entire economic cycles, not simply four-year forecast periods. The UK Government's proposals, however, fall far short of that, yet by exposing the Scottish Government and the Scottish Parliament to cyclical fluctuations in income tax they embed a high degree of volatility in Scotland's public finances, which cannot be right when we are seeking to protect public services and find means to grow the economy. The Bill proposes to allow for annual borrowing of up to £200 million in any one year, and for a maximum limit of £500 million to finance current expenditure where there are differences between forecasts and the outturns of Scottish tax revenue under the Bill's income tax proposals. Loans must be made within four years of being taken out. I understand that these provisions are additional to the provisions of the Scotland Act 1998, which allows revenue borrowing for the purposes of providing cash balances and maintaining cash flow. The aggregate limit of the Act is also £500 million, so the additional purpose proposed in the Bill, plus the passage of the 13 years since the original limit was set, has apparently not been considered sufficient reason for lifting the limit. We do not believe that that is credible. The Bill also lacks flexibility to deal not necessarily with forecast errors, but forecast falls identified in advance. I will return later to the reason that is a problem. More crucially, the provisions in the Bill are insufficient to manage volatility in tax receipts that might reasonably be expected to occur. Importantly, over the past decade, UK Government income tax forecasts have, on average, been overly optimistic, and the annual cap of £200 million would have been insufficient to offset deviations in income tax receipts relative to forecasts in recent years.