Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

I think I have set out why I do not think that that is likely. As we have heard, there are lots of theoretical possibilities that are very outlandish—I do not propose to rehash the conversations that we had at the beginning of this debate—but the Government do not think that they are realistic risks and that is why we do not think that amendments 36 and 37 are acceptable. Let me turn now to the last amendment in this group, amendment 25, which was also tabled by the Opposition. It specifies the wording of motions of no confidence for the purposes of clause 2(2). It aims to remove the discretion of the House over its wording and that of the Speaker in his certifying of a motion of no confidence. The Government recognise that no confidence motions might take different forms, as they do now, but we do not want to remove the flexibility entirely. That raises an issue, which we will come to in the next group of amendments, to do with the House's exclusive cognisance. If we try to set out in statute the precise form of a no confidence motion, that could raise the risks to which the Clerk of the House has alluded. We think it is better for the Speaker's certificate to be conclusive and for the Speaker to determine the nature of that certification. As I said when we touched on this matter in debating a previous group of amendments, if there were doubt—I think it unlikely that there would be—about whether what the House was discussing was a motion of no confidence, it would seem to be sensible for the Government, the Opposition and the Speaker to ensure that Members were clear on that point when they were debating it. I cannot believe that there could ever be a debate in this House about a motion of no confidence in the Government in which Members were sitting there completely unaware that they were debating the future of the Government of our country.