Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

My Lords, in moving Amendment 1, I will speak also to Amendments 3 and 14, which are related or consequential. I have tabled two groups of amendments on this issue in the Bill, both of which deal with problems that follow the Government’s limiting of choice of electoral systems and total failure to consult. Amendments 1, 3 and 14 would provide for the establishment of an inquiry for the purpose of selecting a voting system that, following debate in Parliament and consideration by the Government, would lead to a decision by Parliament on the referendum question. Amendments 25 and 26, which come in a later group, would allow Parliament to decide on an electoral system after a referendum had approved an alternative vote system in principle. Although Amendments 25 and 26 are not in this group, I will seek to degroup them when we reach that debate so that we can consider them at a later stage. At the heart of Amendments 1, 3 and 14 is my concern over the failure of the Government in specifying the optional preferential AV system, which has been decided on without any consultation whatever. The proposed AV system is mired in controversy and has never been the subject of any inquiry or examination. There has been no independent assessment of its impact, nor was the proposed system the subject of any debate in Parliament prior to the Bill. There was not even a full debate in the Commons on its operation. The proposed system is, and always has been, opposed by the Liberal Democrats, whose leader, the Deputy Prime Minister, described it as a ““miserable little compromise””. The proposed system is utterly inconsistent with the historic position taken by the Liberal Democrats and has been opposed by the Conservatives on the basis that it would lead to endless coalition—which, by the way, is untrue. The proposed system has divided the academic world on the basis of its perverse results and it has been heavily criticised by the House of Lords Constitution Committee, whose report stated: "““We regret the fact that this Bill has not been subject to either pre-legislative scrutiny, or to prior public consultation””." Amendment 1 and the associated Amendments 3 and 14 would establish a committee of inquiry that could then make recommendations to Parliament on an electoral system or family of systems. Parliament could then take a view, with the decision on the preferred system being taken by the Secretary of State, who would still have the ultimate responsibility. The Secretary of State’s decision would then be the subject of a debate in Parliament under the affirmative procedure. Opponents of my amendments will argue that such an inquiry would lead to delay. That is true. However, the Government are in a position to set their own timetable. All that matters is that we have a timetable for a time-limited inquiry, which could be agreed either between the parties in this House or between the Government and the parties involved in the debate. If that had happened, much of today’s debate could have been avoided. Certainly, it would have been avoided if the Government had adopted such an approach. If I am honest, criticism can be laid at the door of the previous Labour Government, which introduced without consultation a proposal for the same AV system during consideration of Clause 29 of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill. Along with many other colleagues, we had grave concerns over how that proposal was handled. I recall that a number of colleagues on these Benches had intended to go as far as opposing that provision in the Labour Government’s Bill. With the help of the Cross-Benchers’ objective consideration of highly political matters, we hoped that the Government would, at that stage, have thought again. However, the truth is that we are now going down the same route. We are being railroaded into a system that has never been tested in the United Kingdom. The Bill proposes not the classic AV system used for the Australian federal Parliament—which is favoured by most people who argue the AV position but is not on offer in the Bill—but the system used for the Queensland state parliament, which operates a far more limited system. As I said, the proposed system is mired in controversy. Let me quote at some length from a blog that has been placed on the internet by two professors at the University of Plymouth, who have made a particular examination of the system that the Government are offering. Under the heading, "““Suppose UK voters accept the Alternative Vote in the May referendum… but then don’t use AV to signal multiple party preferences?””—" presumably, the Liberal Democrats want the electorate to use the system in that way—the blog entry states: "““Most of the discussion of the AV referendum assumes that if UK voters endorse changing the voting system, they will be eager to vote 1, 2 3, 4 etc to express support for several or multiple parties. But Colin Rallings and Michael Thrasher have their ""doubts. Reviewing the evidence from Queensland, which uses the same system as the proposed UK alternative vote, they believe that many voters will treat an AV election as just like ‘first past the post’, and not cast (or perhaps over time stop casting) multiple preferences””." They go on to say: "““But evidence from real elections fought using AV or other preference systems suggests that many voters simply vote for their most preferred party and do not bother to rank any of the other competitors. In general elections in Australia not only is voting compulsory””—" which is the case in the Australian federal system but is not on offer here— "““but so is marking a full list of preferences on the AV ballot paper. Electors who fail to rank order every candidate in their constituency have their votes rejected. In the UK, however, it will be up to the voters to decide how many preferences they mark if next year’s referendum is passed””." I hope that the House can see where my argument is going. I am saying that what is on offer in the Bill is a system that does not work. That is why we need an inquiry that can consider a wide variety of AV-based variant systems before a decision is taken by Parliament. The blog goes on to say: "““Exactly this optional preference AV system already applies in some elections in Australia. In Queensland the move from obligatory to optional preference ordering””—" which is the system proposed in the Bill— "““was made in 1992. Initially only about 20 per cent of voters marked a first preference only””." In other words, 80 per cent voted for additional preferences. The blog continues: "““And the parties themselves continued to issue ‘how to vote’ cards to voters indicating how to cast a full list of preferences””." We are told that the system proposed in the Bill does not provide for tactical voting, but it does. The Australian experience shows that such systems lead to very heavy tactical voting, as I am about to show. The blog continues: "““However since 2001, and the Australian Labor Party’s first ‘Just One vote’ campaign, the level of people supporting only one party (called ‘plumping’) in Queensland has been about 60 per cent. In 2009 63 per cent of those who turned out at the state elections voted for just one candidate. In individual constituencies the proportion so doing ranged from a low of 53 per cent to a high of 73 per cent””." Under that system of elections, nearly three-quarters of all electors in particular areas of Australia did not even cast a second-preference vote, never mind all the other additional preferences that they are required to indicate under the other system. The blog continues: "““This behaviour was endorsed by the major political parties who increasingly advised their supporters to vote for them alone. Where parties took a different view (as the Greens did for instance), they were often ignored by voters. For instance, no fewer than 46 per cent of those who gave their first preference to the Greens made no other choice, despite the party advising that second preferences should be given to Labor. Similar behaviour can be found elsewhere in Australia also””." I do not know how far to go on, but I find the whole thing fascinating. The blog goes on: "““On a smaller scale, somewhat similar patterns of behaviour can be spotted in Britain amongst a minority of voters on those occasions where electors have had the opportunity to cast more than one ballot at the same contest. … At the three London mayoral elections in 2000, 2004 and 2008 using the … Supplementary Vote (SV) system””—" which is a variant on the AV system— "““about one in five voters either voted just once or cast both their available votes for a single party candidate””." In other words, only 80 per cent of voters in another system, which the Government reject, have used their additional preferences. Under the proposed optional preference system, a far smaller percentage of people might use their additional votes. The blog continues: "““The more such behaviour is replicated in any future UK general election using AV, the more the result will resemble one fought under the current first past the post system and nullify much of the point of any reform””." Amendment 14 would allow for a sensible, considered and informed assessment, examination and debate of different electoral systems. I have drawn attention to the deficiencies in the voting system that has been selected. Given that there are single-member constituency systems in different parts of the world that work, I should like those systems to be the subject of my proposed committee of inquiry, which could inquire into the operation of the Australian AV federal system, first past the post and the Queensland optional preferential AV system, which I have set out to rubbish today. The committee of inquiry could also inquire into the London AV or supplementary vote system and the contingent vote system that is used for the election of presidents in Sri Lanka. The point is that all those systems should be the subject of an inquiry before a recommendation is made to Parliament. The decision taken during the coalition talks was rushed. No one sat down and said, ““Yes, we want a single-member constituency alternative vote system””. No one said, ““Hang on a minute. From within the family of AV systems, which one should we select?””. The coalition just waved the matter through, perhaps on the basis of some recommendation by the Liberal Democrats, who in many areas have not fully considered all the implications of their proposal. I hope that we can change the recommendation in the Bill with the support of the Cross-Benchers, who should, I think, take a more dispassionate and independent view of what is in the best interests than the politicians might take in these matters. I hope that we can have this inquiry and that, as a result, a far more sensible and informed decision can be taken. I beg to move.