Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill

I thank the Secretary of State for that response, but surely there should be some evidence about how long ministerial careers last. Perhaps this point can be applied directly to him. His ministerial career started in 1997, so, under the 15-year rule, he would start to be affected by the greater openness in just a few years' time, which might or might not be just after he has left office. In contrast, he would be affected in seven years' time under the 20-year rule. Would he would feel distracted from the exercise of his present office by the prospect that he might have to be open about 1997 in a couple of years' time, as opposed to seven years? Given the robustness with which he approaches his job, that seems unlikely. I therefore voice some scepticism about the way the figure has drifted upwards. The second point about which I want to express some scepticism has been raised already in the debate, and has to do with the commercial enterprise exception. I think that a policy decision has been made that has not been acknowledged openly. When commercial organisations or enterprises sign very long-term contracts with public authorities for the provision of public services, they are often very nervous about openness. That is one of the problems: openness is a disincentive for operating the public service in that way. A further problem—and when I was the leader of a council, I used to think that it was really serious—is that that sort of arrangement has the capacity to freeze public policy in one direction for a very long time. The idea that it is at all legitimate for any political authority, whether it be the Government or a local authority, to enter into contracts that last a generation is, I think, problematical. Simply on policy grounds, therefore, I would prefer there to be a disincentive against awarding very long-term contracts of that sort. I can see why commercial interests might be nervous, but I am glad that they are. My third point echoes what the hon. Member for Cannock Chase said. This group of amendments contains one piece of good news, if only in the sense of the dog that did not bark. The Cabinet papers exemption was mooted at an earlier stage, and it is very good news that it does not appear in the Government's final proposals. However, I want to add one point to what the hon. Gentleman said, and it is that the ministerial veto is still in place. That veto was used in connection with the Iraq Cabinet minutes, for example, and again in the case of the Cabinet Committee considering devolution, but I believe that a dangerous drift is taking place. When the veto was used for the first time, the Secretary of State came directly to the House and justified what was going on in an oral statement. He was therefore subject to the accountability of the House, even though everyone said at the time that the case was highly unusual and not a matter of routine. However, in respect of the second case—the one involving the Cabinet Committee and devolution—the Secretary of State made a written statement. He did not come to the House, and I think that we are drifting towards routine objections—[Interruption.] The Secretary of State makes a gesture to show that I have mentioned only two cases. It is true that this is a curve with two points, but where is the trend going? That is the question. I object to the whole idea of a ministerial exemption, as it is a violation of the separation of powers. However, I would be much more comfortable with the present situation if the Government were to say that, whenever the exemption is used, Ministers at the very least will have to come to the House and justify it orally. They must not be allowed to leave that to a written statement.