Apprenticeships, Skills, Children and Learning Bill

As the Under-Secretary said, the second group of amendments contains minor improvements, which we broadly welcome. He made it clear that Lords amendment 67 clarifies the relationship between the YPLA and local authorities, and that is helpful. We have consistently argued that sixth-form colleges should be able to convert to a further education corporation after two rather than five years from when a sixth form college corporation is declared. I acknowledge that the Government have now accepted that argument. The Government also conceded our point about requiring the YPLA and sixth- form colleges to consult the SFC before appointing someone to the board. As the Under-Secretary said, Lords amendment 68 would make it clear that the YPLA had to get approval from the Secretary of State before issuing a direction to a failing authority. Nevertheless, the amendments do not address the fundamental problems of the structure that the Bill proposes. The recession should surely have taught us that we need a dynamic and responsive system. Instead, the Bill represents the needless bureaucratisation of the management and funding of FE, skills, and in particular the apprenticeship system. The abolition of the LSC, the creation of the three new agencies—the YPLA, the SFA and a National Apprenticeship Service—and the placing of further education under LEA control create a system whereby everyone has a say, but no one takes responsibility. Consequently, and perhaps without appropriate thought or planning, I suspect that the new system will be as bad as the LSC and possibly worse. It is more bureaucratic, has a greater capacity for contradiction, overlapping responsibilities and confused lines of accountability. At the very least, it is a wasted opportunity, given that we are getting rid of the LSC. Represented diagrammatically, the system would be a mix of a Jackson Pollock painting and a Heath Robinson drawing. Represented musically, it would be Iron Maiden playing Shostakovich. It is, at best, an extremely muddled and mixed system. At worst, it risks jeopardising the interests of business, learners and the economy as a whole. It is extraordinary that to that littered landscape the Government are adding a new, big role for regional development agencies. The many Government amendments we are now considering are an indication of just how complicated, and in my judgement unworkable, the arrangements that the Bill puts in place are likely to be in practice. Amendment 180, which is to schedule 3—on the appointment of the chief executive of the YPLA—would enable"““Later chief executives…to be appointed””" to"““the YPLA…on conditions of service determined by the YPLA””." We have serious concerns about this change, to which the Minister referred. The new conditions in question are set out in paragraphs 5(1) and (2) of schedule 3. In the initial draft of the Bill, the chief executive was to be appointed by the Secretary of State. Following changes resulting from the debate in the other place, now only the first chief executive will be appointed in that way—subsequent appointments will be made by the YPLA itself, but those will be subject to the Secretary of State's approval. I note what the Minister said on those terms. That creates what was called in ““Monty Python and the Holy Grail”” a ““self-perpetuating autocracy””. It is an extraordinary further complication of what is already a complex system. We do not support that development. Reducing the powers of the Secretary of State over appointments to the YPLA has the effect of weakening democratic accountability. It is a further criticism of the structure that is being proposed—indeed, invented—by the Bill that the lines of accountability to this place are increasingly confused. Members will be concerned that amendment 180 reduces their authority over such matters still further. The YPLA surely should be accountable to the House via the Secretary of State. That is the least we should expect. Since the Secretary of State should have the ultimate responsibility for the performance of the YPLA, surely it is important that he has sufficient authority over it, which should include something as important as the appointment of the chief executive. One of the most damaging consequences of the proliferation of quangos under this Government has been the understandable sense among the public that those with power over their lives are shielded from democratic accountability. Agencies are not answerable to the public. That is why Ministers should retain control over appointments to quangos—so that they can answer for quangos' actions to the public through Parliament. If that does not happen, the link between power and elected accountability is inevitably degraded. Quangos should operate at arm's length from the Government and the Minister with responsibility for them only in a defined and limited range of circumstances, which might include politically impartial decision making, transparent determination of facts or work of a specific technical or regulatory nature. My right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition addressed that in a speech on 6 July and explained how a Conservative Government would approach the management of quangos, which is particularly relevant to the debate on this group of amendments. He said:"““any delegation of power by a minister to a quango will not mean a corresponding delegation of responsibility…our goal is democratic accountability, not bureaucratic accountability””." Amendment 180 takes the opposite approach and is not consistent with accountable government of the kind described by him and, actually, of the kind that is dear to the hearts of all good parliamentarians, regardless of party affiliation. In the other place, my noble Friend Lord De Mauley put the argument persuasively when he pointed out the different constitutional bases of the YPLA and the SFA. There are real doubts about the different personalities of those two organisations and the resulting difficulties of their relationship. He said that the SFA is an agency under the aegis of the Secretary of State, whereas the YPLA is a non-departmental public body. He went on to say:"““we express our opposition to””" the"““government Amendments””" which"““would allow the YPLA the power to appoint its own chief executive, albeit subject to the approval of the Secretary of State. If the YPLA is to exist, it should be held to account in the same way””" as"““the SFA as an agency should be held to account. The principle of democratic accountability must hold fast””—[Official Report, House of Lords, 2 November 2009; Vol. 714, c. 89.]" Part of the confusion that is likely to be created by the Bill will result from the different mechanisms by which those bodies are answerable to the House and to Ministers. The Government are planning an immensely complicated system and it is not, frankly, widely welcomed in the sector. When I speak to people in the sector, they tell me that they too feel that it is going to be convoluted and may be difficult to navigate. The lines of accountability are not as they should be, as I have described. As a result, the new structure is not regarded as likely to be better than the LSC, which is quite an achievement; suddenly, the LSC has friends! The LSC was rather like the red army— though big, insensitive and expensive, it was at least predictable. The new system is anything but. Actually, it is less like Soviet Russia and more like Byzantium. I am surprised, because the Minister is a good Minister, a diligent Member of the this House, a proud member of the Government Front-Bench team, and perhaps Hartlepool Sixth Form college's finest. I am surprised that he can, in all conscience, defend this indefensible cacophony, this awful blurred picture, this Jackson Pollock, Heath Robinson, Iron Maiden, Black Sabbath, Shostakovich structure. Perhaps he thinks it is better than a system that is streamlined, sensitive and responsive to need, and a system that could and would be understood by both learners and employers. I certainly do not.