Coroners and Justice Bill

First, I agree with what the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) said about this being the first time that the Bill's murder provisions have been considered on the Floor of the House. It is extraordinary that the business was arranged in such a way that we could not discuss these and many other important issues about the law of murder. I also associate myself with the hon. and learned Gentleman's remarks on what has happened in respect of the Law Commission. It was given a very narrow remit in the first place, in that it was not allowed to consider the question of a mandatory life sentence for murder; it then produced the best possible report it could in the circumstances—even though it might not have been what it wanted to do had it been left to its own devices—and then the Government cherry-picked even that. I must say that it is hardly convincing for Members on either side of the debate to cite what the Law Commission said in its reports, as I do not think they reflect in any way what it thinks. There are three different kinds of reason on offer in this House and the other place in favour of dropping the sexual infidelity provision the Government originally proposed—clause 45(6)(c). I want to make it clear from the start that I do not agree with the major reason given today, which was implicit in what the Lords said, which is that somehow it is all right for men to use sexual infidelity as an excuse for murder. That is unacceptable. However, two other reasons were on offer, and I shall need to talk about them as well. Some Members have rightly said that it is a matter of fact that there are cases when men especially—although this can happen the other way around—kill in a rage about sexual infidelity. The issue is not whether that is a fact, but whether it is an excuse; it is a question of value, not of fact. On the question of value, I am entirely with the Government. I do not agree that that is a proper reason to offer in defence against a charge of murder, especially given that a charge of murder is one where there is a requisite intention to kill. The defendant is therefore saying, "Yes, I did have that intent. I had all the requisite intention to murder, so it was not that I did not know what I was doing. I did know what I was doing, but the action arose out of these circumstances." That is an unacceptable excuse. I have slightly more sympathy with the second reason raised both here and in the other place, which has to do with the jury. I think the jury does have a place in these cases. I do not think the Government have excluded the jury in the current version of the clause in question either, because they do not say that the judge shall tell the jury how to decide any case where there is sexual infidelity. They simply say that the sexual infidelity is to be disregarded. To whom is that clause addressed? The Government are not entirely clear about that.