Coroners and Justice Bill

Yes, I accept what the noble Lord says and, so far as the noble Baroness is concerned, we are about to come to a series of extended debates on developmental immaturity, diminished responsibility, gross provocation, sexual infidelity, proximity of qualifying triggers et cetera. These are issues that we are going to discuss in much more detail. All I will do is repeat that what is in effect an additional verdict is an innovation; it would have serious and far-reaching ramifications, about which the noble and learned Lord said he was well aware. The first and most obvious is that the noble and learned Lord’s amendment would all but do away with the concept of the mandatory life sentence. Many noble Lords have spoken with eloquence about the need in effect to do that or to recognise that it has virtually disappeared as it is. That, I suppose, is another issue to which we will return. But if the jury was to return a verdict of guilty but with what are called extenuating circumstances, under subsection (3) of the new clause proposed in the amendment the judge would not be obliged to pass a long sentence, notwithstanding subsection (4), which would demand that a judge in such circumstances would have to state his reasons for choosing another sentence. However, we would still be confronted with a situation where a verdict of guilty to murder would not necessarily attract a life sentence. That, therefore, would be the end of the mandatory life sentence. I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say, but if Parliament was minded to take a step such as this, it should do so only after wide consultation and a full debate on the merits of sentencing provision. If we were to accept the noble and learned Lord’s amendment, we would be sidestepping the issue of the mandatory life sentence. I should say to the noble and learned Lord—although he seemed to be well aware of what I was about to say before I stood to make this contribution—that we on these Benches would not wish to do so because we are in favour of keeping the mandatory life sentence and the amendment would undermine that. I am puzzled, too, as is the noble Lord, Lord Clinton-Davis, by subsection (2) of the proposed new clause, which would allow the judge to withhold giving a direction to the jury that it may return a verdict with a rider of extenuating circumstances if he or she feels that a reasonable jury would not do so on the evidence. I ask: what is a reasonable jury? The noble and learned Lord said that it is just a case of looking it up in the Oxford English Dictionary. I have on many occasions looked in that dictionary to find a variety of definitions, but I am not quite sure what this would prove or disprove. Surely if we trust in the way our jury system works, any given jury has to be treated as reasonable. So what grounds would the judge give for withholding his direction? Would it depend on the nature of the evidence or on the nature of the jury? The noble Lord was right to express this, although he gave us to understand that he had already been satisfied by the addition of an amendment.